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elevated standards of conventional hypothesis testing with an approach that fits what
we otherwise think the preponderance standard means.
Through careful argumentation using Bayesian hypothesis testing, the Article
offers a fundamental default rule for statistical estimation evidence: if the evidence
comes from a credibly designed and implemented study, then it is presumptively
admissible and enough to withstand motions for judgment under either Rule 50 or
Rule 56, whenever it points in the direction of the party offering it. In many
situations, the fundamental default rule may be cast as the policy that evidence is
legally suffi cient and presumptively admissible whenever it yields a finding of
statistical significance at the 50 percent level—equivalently, whenever its p-value is
less than 0.5. Thus, the Article indicates that many courts’ current practice is far too
strict with respect to statistical estimation evidence.
The Article also discusses the appropriate gatekeeping role for federal district
courts under Federal Rules of Evidence 403 and 702, and it engages the question of
when courts might legitimately move away from the fundamental default rule for
policy reasons.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article sets forth a theory of how federal courts should handle
statistical estimation evidence—quantitative estimates with hypothesis
testing used to quantify its strength—in civil litigation under certain
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important conditions.1 An example of statistical estimation evidence,
discussed in detail below, is the use of data from a randomized controlled trial
of the effects of the drug Lipitor, which thousands of plaintiffs alleged caused
them to develop Type 2 diabetes.2 In the litigation that ensued, this statistical
estimation evidence went to the question of general causation—whether
Lipitor does, in general, cause diabetes. The disposition of many cases turned
on this question.
In addition to mass torts such as the Lipitor case just noted, statistical
evidence plays an important role in federal litigation involving other important
areas of the law, including employment discrimination cases involving race- or
sex-based differences in promotion rates; securities fraud litigation involving
changes in stock prices on dates of alleged corrective disclosures; and antitrust
cases involving effects on prices in concentrated industries.
My central claim in this Article is that litigants and courts are applying
the wrong standard when—as has often been the case—they use statistical
standards conventionally used by scholars in scholarly work. I develop this
argument in several pieces. First, in Part I, I address the requirements
imposed on statistical estimation evidence by the dominant preponderance
standard for proof in civil litigation. In this Part, I summarize the
conventional hypothesis testing approach, which is based on statistical
significance testing, and contrast it to the Bayesian hypothesis testing
alternative. I then argue that the Bayesian hypothesis testing approach fits
the preponderance standard much better than does the conventional
hypothesis testing approach. And I develop what I call the “fundamental
default rule of statistical estimation evidence.”3 Under this rule, when the
preponderance standard applies, statistical estimation evidence should be
considered legally sufficient and presumptively admissible whenever it points
in the direction of the party proffering it. As I discuss in Section I.E, this
result may be understood in terms of conventional hypothesis testing
methodology, but with the unusually high significance level of 50 percent.4
1 By statistical estimation evidence, I mean quantitative evidence whose importance to the case
typically is assessed through statistical hypothesis testing (which I discuss in detail in Sections I.A–
I.C). I use the term “statistical estimation evidence” so as to distinguish it from classics of “statistical
evidence” like the Blue Bus problem, see, e.g., Edward K. Cheng, Reconceptualizing the Burden of
Proof, 122 YALE L.J. 1254, 1273-74 (2013), for which I offer nothing new here. Scholars discussing
those problems simply take it as given that the proffered probabilities are correct, whereas statistical
estimation evidence involves using methods of statistical inference—hypothesis testing—to
determine what to believe about probabilities of interest.
2 See infra note 10.
3 It is important to understand that the fundamental default rule follows only under certain
assumptions regarding a construct called the plaintiff ’s most favorable juror; see infra Section I.D
for details.
4 This result is not the result of a common fallacy involving the general confusion of p-values
and posterior probabilities; see infra note 93 for details.
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In Part II, I turn to issues related to admissibility of expert testimony
related to statistical estimation evidence. If estimation evidence makes it into
the trial record at all, it is virtually always through that channel. Litigants
battle to get their experts’ testimony admitted and to exclude the other side’s.
With respect to evidence deemed admissible, the parties struggle just as
vigorously over summary judgment. Parties dispute the methods each other’s
experts use, they argue that claimed statistical significance is illusory, and
sometimes they even accuse each other’s experts of doing “junk science” in
violation of the standards set forth by Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and the
Daubert trilogy.5 Some judges display a sophisticated grasp of statistical
concepts in determining which expert testimony to admit, and which will be
deemed legally sufficient.6 Others struggle to referee the battle of the experts.
Litigants and courts frequently focus on conventional hypothesis testing,
by which I mean null hypothesis significance testing, typically at the
significance level of 5%, because that is the approach many statistics-using
scholars take in their scholarly activities. But as Professor Stephen Burbank
once wrote: “Courtrooms are not laboratories.”7 Professor Frederick Schauer
has elaborated on this point, explaining that sometimes “bad science makes
good law.”8 As I shall argue, acting otherwise leads to statistical standards that
5 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); General Electric Co. v. Joiner,
522 U.S. 136 (1997); and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999). On claims about “junk
science,” see generally PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO’S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE
COURTROOM (1991).
6 See, e.g., Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 259 n.3 (1986); Nat’l Abortion Fed. v. Ashcroft, 330
F. Supp. 2d 436, 476-82 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), aff ’d in part, 437 F.3d 278 (2d Cir. 2006), vacated, 224 Fed.
App’x. 88 (2d Cir. 2007).
7 Stephen B. Burbank, The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly, 79 JUDICATURE 318, 322 (1996).
Professor Burbank went on to note that “it may be a mistake to let science furnish not only evidence
with which we adjudicate controversies but the standards for deciding whether evidence can be
considered.” Id. See also Susan Haack, Legal Probabilism: An Epistemological Dissent, in EVIDENCE
MATTERS: SCIENCE, PROOF, AND TRUTH IN THE LAW 55 (2014) (“[A] trial is very different from
an open-ended scientific or scholarly investigation sifting for as long as it takes through all the
evidence that can be had.”); Richard O. Lempert, Uncovering ‘Nondiscernible’ Differences: Empirical
Research and the Jury-Size Cases, 73 MICH. L. REV. 643, 659 (1975) (“The values of social science,
however, are not the values of the law.”). As Daubert itself put it:

The scientific project is advanced by broad and wide-ranging consideration of a
multitude of hypotheses, for those that are incorrect will eventually be shown to be so,
and that in itself is an advance. Conjectures that are probably wrong are of little use,
however, in the project of reaching a quick, final, and binding legal judgment—often
of great consequence—about a particular set of events in the past.
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597.
8 Frederick Schauer, Can Bad Science Be Good Evidence? Neuroscience, Lie-Detection, and
Beyond, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 1191, 1216 (2010); see also Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach
to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1477, 1511 (1999) (“The five percent convention is rooted
in considerations that have no direct relevance to litigation, such as the need to ration pages in
scientific journals.”); Frederick Schauer, Neuroscience, Lie-Detection, and the Law: A Contrarian
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map poorly onto the legal standards that courts otherwise say they use for
civil litigation.9
In Part III, I turn to policy considerations that adopting my analysis and
standard would implicate. These relate to administrability, which would be
greatly improved, and to the social costs and benefits associated with what
would likely be a shift in bargaining power toward various types of plaintiffs
in complex litigation.
In Part IV, I ask whether courts might prefer to apply more demanding
standards than the preponderance standard, given my claims about that
standard in Parts I and II. This is a classic question about the legitimate
powers of courts to make substantive law. Whereas state courts generally have
such powers, the federal courts on which I concentrate in this Article have
such powers only in limited circumstances. I address these circumstances,
differentiating between claims rooted in state law—which raise interesting
but manageable Erie-related questions—from those involving only federal
law. Federal courts in some instances have the power to impose the standards
that I argue, in Parts I and II, fail to match the preponderance standard. But
because adopting such standards involves substantive lawmaking, federal
courts owe litigants and the public more transparency about that activity than
they have provided. Rule of law values demand more in a system of
government founded on predictable laws and observable lawmaking.
Throughout this Article I assume for simplicity that the party offering the
evidence is the plaintiff, as they have the burden of proof, and I consider how
courts should handle either a defendant’s challenge to the legal sufficiency of
estimation evidence (via Rule 50 or Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure), or a defendant’s motion to exclude the plaintiff ’s expert
testimony about that evidence (via Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence). I explain why common practice by litigants and courts fails to
satisfy the preponderance standard. And I use a combination of black-letter
doctrine and mathematical statistics to justify a simple alternative—what I
View, 14 TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCI. 101, 102 (2003) (“[W]hat is good enough for science might
still not be good enough for law, and what is not good enough for science might sometimes be good
enough for law.”).
9 Consider, for example, the statistical measure called the p-value. As one Reference Manual
on Scientific Evidence chapter puts it, the p-value for measuring statistical significance “is the
probability of extreme data given the null hypothesis. [It] is not the probability of the null hypothesis
given extreme data.” David H. Kaye & David A. Freedman, Reference Guide on Statistics, in FEDERAL
JUDICIAL CENTER, REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 250 (3d ed. 2011)
[hereinafter “RMSE”]. Yet some courts and litigants confuse the p-value with the probability that
one party or another has a stronger case, or with the probability that an observed estimate is the
result of random chance rather than a causal relationship. See id. at 250-251, n.99 (collecting cases);
see also David H. Kaye, Is Proof of Statistical Significance Relevant?, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1333, 1334 (1986)
(arguing that “explicit hypothesis testing is poorly suited for courtroom use” and that “[s]tatements
as to what results are or are not ‘statistically significant’ should be inadmissible.”).
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call the fundamental default rule of estimation evidence. According to this rule,
estimation evidence is legally sufficient and generally admissible when it
points in the direction of the party offering the evidence.
To motivate my discussion, I use mass-tort litigation involving the
prescription anti-cholesterol drug Lipitor. Thousands of women sued Pfizer,
the drug’s producer, alleging that Lipitor caused them to develop type 2
diabetes.10 This was a multidistrict litigation (MDL), with all the
complexities that arise in such cases. I focus here on one aspect of the MDL,
which involved plaintiffs’ general causation expert, Dr. Sonal Singh. General
causation in this context concerns whether Lipitor can cause type 2 diabetes
in general, in the population, apart from whether it caused any particular
plaintiff ’s disease.11
Based on his expert report and deposition testimony, Dr. Singh was
prepared to testify at trial that taking Lipitor at a 10mg dose causes onset of
type 2 diabetes to at least some extent.12 After a Daubert hearing,13 the district
court excluded Dr. Singh’s testimony regarding a 10mg dosage of Lipitor
because Dr. Singh testified that the statistical estimation evidence underlying
his testimony was not statistically significant at conventional levels of
significance—i.e., a significance level of .05, which is frequently used in
scholarly publication.14 With Dr. Singh excluded, the plaintiffs were left with
no ability to prove general causation, leading to the grant of judgment as to
many of the cases associated with the MDL.15 The Fourth Circuit recently
affirmed the district court’s determination on this matter.16
These courts got this issue wrong.
When the preponderance standard applies, a juror is asked to determine
whether the plaintiff ’s or the defendant’s story is more probable in light of
the evidence. But the analytical foundation of conventional hypothesis
testing is entirely unrelated to this question. Instead, conventional
hypothesis testing as conventionally practiced (i) asks how unlikely it would
be to observe the evidence if the defendant’s position were right, and then (ii)

10 In re Lipitor (Atorvastatin Calcium) Mktg., Sales Practices and Prod. Liab. Litig. (No. II)
MDL 2502, 892 F.3d 624, 629 (4th Cir. 2018).
11 Id. at 638.
12 Id.
13 “Daubert hearing” is a colloquial term often used to describe a hearing to determine whether
and/or to what extent an expert’s testimony should be admitted.
14 See id. at 638 (“[T]he district court excluded Dr. Singh’s opinion for each dose except 80 mg.”).
15 Id. at 631.
16 Id. at 649. For an amicus brief regarding the aspect of the appeal that involved the
admissibility of Dr. Singh’s testimony with respect to the 10mg dose, see Brief for Amicus Curiae
Jonah B. Gelbach in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants, In Re Lipitor (Atorvastatin Calcium) Mktg.,
Sales Practice & Prod. Liab. Litig. (No. II) MDL 2502, 892 F.3d 624 (4th Cir. 2018), 2017 WL 1628475.
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determines in favor of the defendant unless the answer is that the evidence
would be extremely unlikely.
That’s a problem. Think about the preponderance standard as it is
understood in cases with only non-statistical evidence.17 In those cases, the
plaintiff can win even if jurors think the defendant is not all that unlikely to
be right, given the evidence. If a juror determines that the plaintiff ’s litigation
position is more probable than the defendant’s, the juror is supposed to find
for the plaintiff. And it is a hoary truism that “more probable” is satisfied by
even very small differences in a juror’s belief. As the Vermont Supreme Court
explained it recently, preponderance is satisfied even when the addition of
evidence causes evenly balanced “scales [to] drop but a feather’s weight.”18
Further, when a defendant moves for judgment—whether it is for
summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law19—the court is not
supposed to grant it unless it’s the case that no reasonable juror could find
for the plaintiff.20 And in making its determination, a court ruling on a
motion for judgment is supposed to view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff.21 Conventional hypothesis testing fails to reflect
these principles as well.
This Article develops the primary alternative to conventional hypothesis
testing for assessing estimation evidence: Bayesian hypothesis testing.
Beginning in the late 1960s, Bayesian theory became one of the primary
approaches legal scholars have used to understand evidence as a general
matter (i.e., not just estimation evidence).22 Over roughly the last quarter
century, Professor Ronald Allen and coauthors have mounted a frontal attack
on the application of Bayesian theory in the law.23 Allen’s relative plausibility
of competing explanations approach has gained much ground in the field, and

17 For an argument that courts should view the admissibility of expert evidence like that of
non-expert evidence, see Frederick Schauer & Barbara Spellman, Is Expert Evidence Really Different?,
88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 4 (2013).
18 In re M.L., 993 A.2d 400, 407 (Vt. 2010) (quoting Livanovitch v. Livanovitch, 131 A. 799,
800 (1926)).
19 I will use the term “motion for judgment” and the like as a generic term that encompasses
both sorts of motions; what matters is that the legal sufficiency of the record’s evidence is being
tested. To the extent that my arguments apply in state courts, one should think of “motion for
judgment” as also embracing motions for j.n.o.v. and so on.
20 See FED. R. CIV. P. 50(A)(1) (limiting judgment as a matter of law to those circumstances in
which “the court finds that a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to
find for the party on that issue”); FED. R. CIV. P. 56(A) (invoking “entitle[ment] to judgment as a
matter of law” as a necessary condition for when summary judgment may be granted).
21 Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1866 (2014).
22 See, e.g., John Kaplan, Decision Theory and the Factfinding Process, 20 STAN. L. REV. 1065, 1083
(1968) (noting that Bayes’ Theorem was first used to explain the probabilities of events “only a few
years ago”).
23 See supra notes 56-61 and accompanying text.
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he and Professor Michael Pardo have recently argued that it has reached
paradigm status.24 Still, as I explain in Section I.C, there are good reasons
why even those in the relative plausibility camp should accept my approach
when estimation evidence is at issue.
Section I.D presents the analytical core of this Article, which revolves
around a hypothetical person called the “plaintiff ’s most favorable juror.”25
This juror has neutral prior beliefs in the sense that before she sees any
evidence, she believes that the plaintiff and defendant litigation positions are
equally probable; in Bayesian terms, this juror places equal prior probability
on the event that each party is right. Whether the juror would find for the
plaintiff on the question related to the estimation evidence thus depends on
whether the estimation evidence causes her to update her beliefs in favor of
the plaintiff or the defendant. What makes the plaintiff ’s most favorable juror
notable is that estimation evidence pointing in favor of the plaintiff
necessarily will cause her to update her beliefs in the direction of the
plaintiff ’s litigation position. And because she started out neutral, this juror’s
beliefs after she sees the estimation evidence must favor the plaintiff. When
the evidence points in the plaintiff ’s direction, the plaintiff ’s most favorable
juror will think the plaintiff has satisfied the preponderance standard. That’s
enough for legal sufficiency.
To illustrate what it means for estimation evidence to point in the
plaintiff ’s direction, consider again the Lipitor litigation. At issue was the
true difference in the probability of being diagnosed with type 2 diabetes.
Estimation evidence on this question came from a large randomized
controlled trial, in the form of the difference in the observed frequency of
type 2 diabetes onset among those who were randomly assigned to take
Lipitor or a placebo.26 To say the estimation evidence points in the direction
of the plaintiff is to say simply that the frequency of new diagnoses of type 2
diabetes was greater among those assigned to Lipitor than among those
assigned the placebo. One doesn’t need to know the level of statistical

24 Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, Relative Plausibility and Its Critics, 23 INT’L J.
EVIDENCE & PROOF 6-7 (2019).
25 The concept of the plaintiff ’s most favorable juror was introduced in my coauthored work
with Professor Bruce Kobayashi. Jonah B. Gelbach & Bruce H. Kobayashi, Legal Suffi ciency of
Statistical Evidence (16 George Mason Legal Studies Research Paper No. LS 18-29, 2018),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3238793) [https://perma.cc/798L-MJF2].
26 The results from the trial used in this Article may be found in Table 3 of Peter S. Sever et al.,
Prevention of Coronary and Stroke Events with Atorvastatin in Hypertensive Patients who have Average or
Lower-than-Average Cholesterol Concentrations, in the Anglo-Scandinavian Cardiac Outcomes Trial—Lipid
Lowering Arm (ASCOT-LLA): A Multicentre Randomised Controlled Trial, 361 LANCET 1149, 1153 (2003).
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significance of such an estimated difference to know that a greater frequency
among Lipitor takers points toward the plaintiff ’s litigation position.27
This is a radically more forgiving standard than what courts handling
estimation evidence often do. But paying attention to the plaintiff ’s most
favorable juror exactly captures what it means to view the evidence in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff. This means estimation evidence is legally
sufficient when the plaintiff ’s most favorable juror would find for the plaintiff
on the question addressed by that evidence. Accordingly, a defendant’s
motion for judgment may not be granted on the element involving estimation
evidence when the plaintiff ’s most favorable juror would find for the plaintiff
as to that evidence.
Part I of the Article discusses the above relationship between hypothesis
testing and legal sufficiency. It shows that the estimation evidence at issue in
the Lipitor litigation discussed above was strong enough to be legally
sufficient for the claim that a 10mg dose of Lipitor generally causes type 2
diabetes. It also discusses the dramatic extent to which conventional
hypothesis testing at conventional significance levels raises the standard of
proof facing plaintiffs.
Part II turns to two issues related to the admissibility of estimation
evidence. The first is evidentiary relevance: when does estimation evidence
meet Rule 401’s standard of making a fact of consequence more or less
probable? As one would think, legally sufficient evidence generally meets that
bar. Thus estimation evidence that points in the plaintiff ’s direction generally
should be admissible except when it runs afoul of Rule 403’s balancing test or
Rule 702’s reliability requirements.
Many courts have excluded expert testimony about estimation evidence
that doesn’t meet conventional hypothesis testing significance levels such as
5% (equivalently, the 95% confidence level).28 Yet it is a mistake to associate
27 That said, the discussion below shows that the criterion of pointing toward the plaintiff ’s
litigation position turns out to be equivalent to conventional hypothesis testing with a significance
level of 50%. See infra Part I.D.
28 Consider toxic tort case Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 874 F.2d 307, 312 (5th Cir. 1989),
amended by 884 F.2d 167, 167 (5th Cir. 1989), a Bendectin case in which the Fifth Circuit overturned
a jury verdict for the plaintiff and issued the per curiam statement that “[W]e do not wish this case
to stand as a bar to future Bendectin cases in the event that new and conclusive studies emerge which
would give a jury a firmer basis on which to determine the issue of causation.” The epidemiology
chapter in the Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence cites several subsequent cases in which trial
courts excluded expert testimony for lack of statistical significance. Michael D. Green, D. Michal
Freedman & Leon Gordis, Reference Guide on Epidemiology, in FED. JUDICIAL CTR., REFERENCE
MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 578-79 n.85 (3d ed. 2011) [hereinafter RMSE].
In the discrimination field, consider the pre-Daubert case of Palmer v. Shultz, in which female
employees of the State Department alleged the foreign service discriminated against them with
respect to various personnel policies. 815 F.2d 84, 89 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The D.C. Circuit undertook
a long discussion of conventional hypothesis testing methodology and concluded that statistical

2020]

Estimation Evidence

559

significance level and reliability. As I explain in Section II.C, the level of
statistical significance is best understood not as a measure of reliability, but
rather as a measure of the strength of estimation evidence that may or may
not be reliable for the question to which it is directed. My argument may be
summarized using a simple question: If a study’s results would be “unreliable”
when they are statistically significant only at the 15% level, how can these
results be “reliable” if they are significant at the 5% level? It’s the same study,
carried out by the same people, studying the same phenomena. To be clear, I
am not arguing that the level of statistical significance is irrelevant to
litigation. Estimation evidence that favors a proposition can do so with
varying strength. But that is true of any kind of evidence.
Adopting the fundamental default rule proposed here would increase the
set of estimation evidence that is admissible and legally sufficient. This would
affect both the ease with which judges can manage complex litigation and its
volume. Part III engages these issues. It also discusses the allocation of error
risks across plaintiffs and defendants, explaining that the fundamental default
rule best represents what the Supreme Court has repeatedly said: that error
risks should be equally balanced.
That said, I do not claim that the preponderance standard is actually
optimal from a policy point of view. Consider securities fraud litigation. Each
day thousands of stocks trade on various exchanges in the U.S. So it is also true
that thousands of stocks see positive returns and thousands see negative returns
each day.29 Applying the properly understood preponderance of the evidence
standard to securities litigation would probably induce a massive increase in the
amount of such litigation, sometimes in some very marginal cases. But this is
an argument in favor of developing and sensibly applying a higher standard
that better reflects policy goals30—not an argument for pretending the law
means something other than what courts otherwise say it does.
evidence would have to meet the standard for significance at least at the 5% level. Id. at 96; see also
Dicker v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., No. 89-4982., 1997 WL 182290, at *42 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 9, 1997)
(finding that because “Plaintiffs have not met the burden of showing a statistically significant
difference in promotion rates . . . . Their claim . . . is dismissed.” (emphasis added)).
In the securities litigation arena, consider Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 309 F.R.D.
251 (N.D. Tex. 2015). Following remand by the Fifth Circuit, the district court conducted a searching
Daubert hearing and delivered a lengthy opinion whose conclusions as to class certification were
mostly driven by its determinations as to the statistical significance of event study results at a
confidence level of 95%. Id. at 262.
29 To be precise, what matters is not the daily stock return, but the daily excess return after
accounting for other factors likely to be associated with stock-price movements. See Jill E. Fisch,
Jonah B. Gelbach & Jonathan Klick, The Logic and Limits of Event Studies in Securities Fraud Litigation,
96 TEX. L. REV. 553, 574-75 (2018).
30 The EEOC’s four-fifths rule, which federal courts have approved, could be seen in this way.
Applying the fundamental default rule to employment discrimination cases would create some
situations in which estimation evidence would virtually always be legally sufficient to establish
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Part IV addresses some questions related to the substantive lawmaking
powers of federal courts. As noted above, in this Part I argue that federal
courts could legitimately adopt elevated proof standards for statistical
estimation evidence where those courts have common law powers. But where
they do that, they should do it more openly, and with more attention to
whether Congress, or agencies, would be the better source for such decisions.
In sum, this Article radically rethinks the treatment of statistical
estimation evidence in federal civil litigation. It proposes an approach that
harmonizes legal standards and statistical concepts, replacing the arbitrary
and elevated standards of conventional hypothesis testing with an approach
that fits what the preponderance standard means when non-statistical
evidence is at issue. And it shows how courts might in some cases legitimately
move away from that standard where doing so makes policy sense, taking
seriously the limited but real common law powers of federal courts.31
I. BAYESIAN HYPOTHESIS TESTING APPLIED TO LEGAL SUFFICIENCY
AND THE PREPONDERANCE STANDARD YIELDS
A FUNDAMENTAL DEFAULT RULE
This Part begins in Section I.A with a quick discussion of the basic
principles of conventional hypothesis testing, as applied to the Lipitor MDL.
Section I.B then introduces the basic framework of Bayesian hypothesis
testing. Section I.C engages the general critiques of Bayesian approaches that
evidence scholars have lodged, arguing that in the estimation evidence
context, Bayesian hypothesis testing is an acceptable framework. Section I.D
then introduces the hypothetical plaintiff ’s most favorable juror and explains
how seeing estimation evidence through this juror’s eyes corresponds to
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. The
fundamental default rule follows directly. Section I.E then revisits the
conventional hypothesis testing approach, explaining that its use effectively
raises the legal standard far above the preponderance level.

disparate impact for at least one group. Although the four-fifths rule is often seen as plaintifffriendly, it would protect employers from that unreasonable outcome. Another setting in which
agency rulemaking could be used to set the standard of proof for litigation is securities fraud
litigation; for an argument in favor, see Jill E. Fisch & Jonah B. Gelbach, Power and Statistical
Significance in Securities Fraud Litigation, HARV. BUS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (draft on file with
author).
31 Much of what I argue applies in state courts as well, except insofar as states have chosen different
evidentiary standards of proof. I focus on federal courts in this paper only for length reasons.
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A. A Brief Description of Conventional Hypothesis Testing
Attention in conventional hypothesis testing centers on the question of
how unlikely it would be to observe the actually-observed data in the
counterfactual event that the variable of interest had a particular value. This
particular value is known as the “null value,” and the hypothesis that the
variable has that value is known as the “null hypothesis.”32 In the Lipitor
litigation, the null hypothesis of interest is that Lipitor has no effect on type
2 diabetes incidence, so the null value is zero.
The relevant data from the Lipitor litigation come from the ASCOTLLA randomized trial.33 The data show that type 2 diabetes incidence was
3.0% among those who received Lipitor in 10mg doses and was 2.6% for the
control group that received a placebo.34 The difference in incidence was thus
0.4 percentage points—roughly a 15% increase over the no-Lipitor incidence.
On its face, this evidence indicates that Lipitor is associated with an increase
in type 2 diabetes—not a good thing, and one that might bring tort liability.
An expert using conventional hypothesis testing won’t stop with what I
just described as the facial conclusion, though: she will ask whether this
difference is enough greater than zero to be “statistically significantly
different from zero”; this is sometimes shortened to just “statistically
significant.” To answer that question, the difference in type 2 diabetes
incidence can be converted into a t-statistic.35 When the null hypothesis is that
the true incidence is zero, the t-statistic is the ratio of the difference in incidence
rates—here, 0.4 percentage points—to the estimated standard error of this
difference.36 In the Lipitor case, the value of the resulting t-statistic is 1.2.37
For more on null hypothesis significance testing, see Kaye & Friedman, supra note 9, at 249-53.
Sever et al., supra note 26, at 1153.
Id.; see also Gelbach & Kobayashi, supra note 25, for more detailed statistical arguments
related to those in this paper.
35 For a discussion of t-statistics, see Kaye & Freedman, supra note 9, at 282 (explaining that a
“t-statistic is [an] estimated value divided by its standard error” and discussing the distribution of
t-statistics under the null hypothesis).
36 If the null hypothesis were that the true difference in incidence had some other null value,
then an expert using conventional hypothesis testing would first subtract that null value from the
estimated difference in incidence, and only then divide by the estimated standard error.
37 This calculation follows from the following facts. First, a consistent estimator of the variance
of an estimated proportion, 𝑞𝑞", is given by 𝑞𝑞"($ − 𝑞𝑞")/𝑛𝑛, where 𝑛𝑛 is the number of observations from
which the estimate is computed. Second, a consistent estimator of the variance of the difference
between one estimated proportion and another is the sum of their estimated variances (when they
are independent, as is the case here). Third, a consistent estimator of the standard error of the
difference between two estimated proportions is the square-root of any consistent estimator of the
variance. Fourth, in the ASCOT-LLA trial, there were 5,168 subjects assigned to the Lipitor
treatment, of whom 154 were determined to have developed type 2 diabetes thereafter. Sever et al.,
supra note 26, at 1151, 1153. Fifth, there were 5,137 subjects assigned to receive the placebo, of whom
134 were determined to have developed type 2 diabetes thereafter. Id. Plugging these numbers into
32
33
34
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The ASCOT-LLA trial had more than 10,000 subjects in the treatment
and placebo groups combined.38 That is helpful for various reasons, but for
our purposes the key one is that when the sample size is large, the t-statistic
has an approximately normal distribution with variance equal to 1. If the null
hypothesis were true, then the true type 2 diabetes incidence would be the
same in the treatment and placebo groups. Thus, the t-statistic has an average
value of zero under the null hypothesis.
So when the null hypothesis is true, the t-statistic has a normal
distribution with mean 0 and variance 1. The percentiles of this distribution
are known. Therefore, one can determine the “critical value” such that a
random draw from this distribution will exceed that critical value only 5% of
the time; this value is roughly 1.65. An expert using conventional hypothesis
testing at the 5% significance level will “reject” the null hypothesis whenever
the observed t-statistic exceeds 1.65, and not otherwise.39 By design, this test
procedure will cause an expert to reject the null hypothesis when it is actually
true only 5% of the time.40
When the statistical estimation evidence leads the expert to reject the null
hypothesis at a given significance level, one says that an estimate is statistically
significant at that level, e.g., “statistically significant at the 5% (or 0.05) level.”
the formulas just described and dividing the difference in type 2 diabetes incidence by the result
yields a t-statistic of 1.2.
38 Id. at 1151.
39 To be more precise, this is how an expert using a one-sided conventional hypothesis test
would behave. The other type of composite hypothesis test is the two-sided test. With a two-sided
test, the expert rejects the null hypothesis whenever the observed t-statistic is far from zero in either
direction—i.e., large negative values are treated as evidence against the null hypothesis (this
approach can be implemented by rejecting the null hypothesis whenever the absolute value of the tstatistic exceeds the critical value). At least one court has expressed the belief that two-sided tests
are preferable, even though that may make no sense in the litigation in question. See, e.g., E.E.O.C.
v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, 698 F.2d 633, 660 (4th Cir. 1983), rev’d sub nom, Cooper v. Fed.
Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U.S. 867, 104 S. Ct. 2794, 81 L. Ed. 2d 718 (1984) (“[W]e are not
persuaded that it is at all proper to use a test such as the ‘one-tail’ test which all opinion finds to be
skewed in favor of plaintiffs in discrimination cases . . .”); cf. In re Novatel Wireless Sec. Litig., 910
F. Supp. 2d 1209, 1216 (S.D. Cal. 2012), order vacated on reconsideration, No. 08CV1689 AJB RBB,
2013 WL 494361 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 2013), on reconsideration in part, No. 08CV1689 AJB (RBB), 2013
WL 12144149 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2013), vacated, No. 08CV1689 AJB (RBB), 2013 WL 12144150 (S.D.
Cal. Oct. 25, 2013) (stating that because experts in the case disagreed on the question, the onesided/two-sided issue “is not an issue of admissibility, but rather of probative value to be addressed
at trial”). A large negative value of the observed t-statistic in the Lipitor litigation, for example,
would suggest that Lipitor actually reduced type 2 diabetes incidence, in which case the plaintiffs
would have no entitlement to any remedy. My argument works either way, although if two-sided
testing is used then the precise numbers I discuss below would change somewhat.
40 Another way to say this is that the probability of a false positive—rejecting the null
hypothesis when it is actually true, also known as the Type I error rate—is the same as the
significance level. A significance level greater than 5%, such as 10%, is more forgiving and will
entail a lower critical value; a more demanding significance level, such as 1%, will have a greater
critical value.
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An equivalent statement for current purposes is that the estimate is
“statistically significant at the 95% confidence level,” because the “confidence
level” is defined to be 100% times one minus the significance level.
An equivalent way to understand conventional hypothesis testing involves
the concept of p-values. For present purposes, the p-value is the probability
that we would observe a value at least as extreme as the actually observed tstatistic’s value, if we took a new random draw from the normal distribution
with mean 0 and variance 1 (because this is the distribution of the t-statistic
that holds under the null hypothesis). It can be shown that a policy of
rejecting the null hypothesis whenever the observed t-statistic exceeds the
critical value described above is equivalent to a policy of rejecting the null
hypothesis whenever the p-value is less than the significance level. Thus,
statistical significance at a given significance level or confidence level and the
p-value are intimately related concepts.
As applied to civil litigation, the justification for using conventional
hypothesis testing must be based on the claim that in a legal sufficiency
challenge, we should default to the defendant’s position unless the observed
data provide evidence that would be very unlikely to occur if the defendant’s
position were true.
In scholarly and other research contexts, failure to reject the null
hypothesis does not generally mean that one accepts the truth of the null
hypothesis. It could be that the null hypothesis is false, but the observed tstatistic fell short of the critical value due to random variation in the sample
that was selected for study.41 Scholars and other researchers typically have the
luxury of reserving judgment until more evidence trots along.
But in the litigation context, this is problematic. For one thing, the
approach considers only the behavior of the t-statistic when the defendant’s
position is correct; it pays no heed to the comparative likelihood of the
observed data when the plaintiff ’s position is correct. A value of the t-statistic
could be not-all-that-unlikely when the defendant is right, but extremely
likely otherwise. It is inconsistent with the nature of legal factfinding to
ignore half of the picture in this way. For example, in a tort case that did not
involve statistical evidence, fact finders would be expected to pay attention
not only to how likely the observed evidence would be if the defendant had
taken due care, but also to the likelihood of the evidence if the plaintiff’s
allegation of carelessness were true.
A second problem with conventional hypothesis testing is that the choice
of significance level both (i) determines the result of the test for any given tstatistic and (ii) is entirely arbitrary. The significance level is determinative
because for any value of the observed t-statistic, there exist sufficiently
41

Such a false negative outcome is known as a Type II error.
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relaxed significance levels so that the expert would reject the null hypothesis
and sufficiently demanding ones so that the expert would fail to reject.42 It is
arbitrary because no reason but decades of conventional practice explains
applied statisticians’ typical use of the 5% significance level. Indeed, that
standard seems to have taken hold merely because of an offhand remark by
influential statistician R. A. Fisher nearly a century ago:
The value for which [the significance level is] .05, or 1 in 20, is 1.96 or nearly
2; it is convenient to take this point as a limit in judging whether a deviation
is to be considered significant or not. Deviations exceeding twice the standard
deviation are thus formally regarded as significant.43

Moreover, as Judge Posner put it, “The five percent test is a convention
employed in academic research,” but it is “not one to which the research
community adheres rigidly.”44
Thus, conventional hypothesis testing bears little resemblance to the
preponderance standard as courts describe that standard; it is an apple to the
preponderant orange. Still, as I discuss in Section I.E, it is possible to say
some useful things about the standard of evidence implied by various choices
of conventional hypothesis testing’s significance level. Before we get there,
though, we must discuss Bayesian hypothesis testing.
B. The Bayesian Hypothesis Testing Approach
Bayesian theory is about how new information should cause a person to
update her beliefs about the probability that a proposition is true.45 Suppose
the proposition is that the US soccer team will win a particular soccer game.
New information comes along, in the form of the score at halftime. Before
the game starts, our observer thinks the US has a 20 percent chance to win.
In Bayesian terms, this is the prior probability in favor of a U.S. win. The
prior probability of an event is also known as the event’s unconditional
probability.
It is often helpful to work with odds rather than probabilities. The odds
in favor of a U.S. win are the ratio of the probability that the U.S. wins to
42 Another way to put this is that as the significance level varies from 0 to 1, the range of critical
values varies from −∞ to ∞.
43 STEPHEN T. ZILIAK & DEIRDRE N. MCCLOSKEY, THE CULT OF STATISTICAL
SIGNIFICANCE: HOW THE STANDARD ERROR COSTS US JOBS, JUSTICE, AND LIVES 45 (2008)
(quoting Fisher).
44 Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1477, 1511
(1999) (describing alternative approaches of using the 10 percent or other levels).
45 Readers interested in more about Bayesian theory, situated in the legal context, might
consult MICHAEL O. FINKELSTEIN & BRUCE LEVIN, STATISTICS FOR LAWYERS 75-81 (2001) or
Kaye & Freedman, supra note 9, at 273-75.
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the probability that the U.S. does not win. Because our observer thinks the
prior probability is 20 percent that the U.S. will win and 80 percent that the
U.S. will not win, her odds in favor of a U.S. win are one-fourth (20 divided
by 80). Notice that a probability below 50 percent is the same as odds below
1, and a probability above 50 percent is the same as odds above 1.
Now suppose our observer finds out the U.S. has a lead at halftime. What
should our observer think about the odds in favor of a U.S. win now? To ask
this question is to ask what should be the odds in favor of a U.S. win given
the information that the U.S. leads at the half. These odds are known as the
posterior odds, or, equivalently, the conditional odds.
Bayes’s Theorem tells us how the observer can update her beliefs in a way
that is consistent with the conventional laws of probability. Suppose for a
moment there is only one score by which the U.S. could win, and only one
score by which it could fail to win. In statistical lingo, this means that both
outcomes involve simple hypotheses. Then a foundational mathematical fact
known as Bayes’s Theorem says that the conditional odds equal the product
of the unconditional odds and the likelihood ratio:46
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝑂𝑂𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂 = 𝑈𝑈𝑛𝑛𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝑂𝑂𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂 × 𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶ℎ𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ($)

The likelihood ratio term is the key to understanding how information
causes Bayesian decisionmakers to change their beliefs by updating from
unconditional to conditional odds. The numerator of this ratio is the
probability that the U.S. team would be expected to have a halftime lead in
those games the team will go on to win. This probability is also the likelihood
of a U.S. win given that the team has a halftime lead.47 The denominator of
the likelihood ratio in our example is the probability the U.S. will have a
halftime lead in those games the team goes on to lose; it is also known as the
likelihood that the U.S. will not win, given the halftime lead.48
46 This representation of the theorem, using “posterior” and “prior” in place of “conditional”
and “unconditional,” appears in, e.g., David H. Kaye & George Sensabaugh, Reference Guide on DNA
Identification Evidence, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 9, at 173.
The discussion in the text above glosses over some important details in which there are multiple
ways in which F could occur. I discuss these issues below.
47 The probability in question is the probability of an outcome (the U.S. has a lead at the half)
given the probability distribution induced by a condition (that the U.S. will go on to win). This fits
the definition of likelihood given by IAN HACKING, LOGIC OF STATISTICAL INFERENCE 54
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2016).
48 Notice that the likelihood of the true state of the world given the observed data equals
the probability of observing data given the true state of the world. This is a definitional
property of likelihood.
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The likelihood ratio exceeds 1 when the likelihood of a U.S. win given the
information that the U.S. has a halftime lead exceeds the likelihood of a U.S.
loss given that information. Then equation (1) implies that the conditional
odds in favor of a U.S. win are greater than the unconditional odds.49 If we
knew the specific probabilities in question, we could use them to arrive at the
numeric value of the conditional odds in favor of a U.S. win. But we don’t
need to know particular numeric values to grasp the main point of this
discussion, which is that new information causes a Bayesian observer to
increase her odds when the likelihood ratio exceeds 1.
So far I’ve assumed issues related to the fact that the likelihood of
different winning scores might vary. In the real world, there are multiple
scores by which a team can win or lose a soccer game. An observer may place
different prior probabilities on the event that a team wins by different scores.
For example, before the game starts, anyone who understands soccer will
believe that the U.S. team is more likely to win by one goal than by forty.
This means we must take account of what statisticians call composite
hypotheses—overall hypotheses that are composed of multiple simple
hypotheses. To accommodate composite hypotheses, we modify equation (1)
as follows:
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝑂𝑂𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂

=

𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑂𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝑈𝑈𝑛𝑛𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝑂𝑂𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂
×

?@ABCDA EFGAHFIJJK JL M$
?@ABCDA EFGAHFIJJK JL MN

,

(2)

The qualifier “Overall” indicates that the prior, or unconditional, beliefs
in question account for the probability the observer places on all the ways the
U.S. team could win, and the probability she places on all the ways the team
could lose.
Another difference between equations (1) and (2) is that instead of a
likelihood ratio, the final term in the latter equation is the ratio of average
likelihoods. The numerator is the average likelihood in favor of a U.S. team
win, which is denoted “𝐻𝐻$ ”—short for the hypothesis that the U.S. team will
win. This average likelihood is the average value of the likelihood function
across all ways the U.S. team might win. In computing the average, the
Bayesian will use her prior beliefs about each possible score to determine how
much weight each score should get in the average likelihood. The

49 Relatedly, according to Hacking’s law of likelihood, evidence supports one hypothesis over
another if the likelihood of the first hypothesis is greater than the second. Id.
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denominator is constructed analogously—it’s the average of the likelihood
that the team fails to win in each possible way.
The ratio of average likelihoods is known as the Bayes factor in favor of
the numerator hypothesis. It plays the same role in composite-hypothesis
problems that the likelihood ratio plays in the simple-hypothesis setting: to
get to conditional odds, we multiply overall unconditional odds by the Bayes
factor. So an observer’s beliefs move toward a hypothesis when the Bayes
factor exceeds 1. Thus, a U.S. lead at halftime increases our Bayesian
observer’s odds in favor of a U.S. win if the average likelihood of a U.S. win,
given a halftime lead, exceeds the average likelihood of a U.S. non-win.
These ideas have a direct application to litigation involving estimation
evidence, as the Lipitor litigation example nicely illustrates. Rather than “the
U.S. team will win,” think of the numerator hypothesis as “Lipitor increases
type 2 diabetes incidence.” And think of the denominator hypothesis as
“Lipitor does not increase type 2 diabetes incidence.” Then the conditional
odds become the odds in favor of the plaintiff ’s litigation position once the
jury finds out about the estimation evidence. Because odds exceeding 1 and
the numerator probability exceeding the denominator probability are the
same thing, a juror will favor the plaintiff’s litigation position when her
conditional odds exceed 1.
Take the unconditional odds first. Because these involve nothing but
jurors’ prior beliefs, unconditional odds are inherently subjective. That seems
to make it intractable to use Bayesian hypothesis testing. Some legal scholars
contend with this aspect of the problem by arguing that whatever jurors’
actual prior beliefs, for fairness reasons we should act as if jurors have equal
prior beliefs in federal civil litigation.50 Alternatively, prior odds of 1
naturally arise as the result of applying the so-called minimax criterion in
evidence models.51
Without rejecting either of these positions, I take a weaker position: in
general, a reasonable juror could have overall unconditional odds equal to 1.
This is all that is needed for purposes of analyzing motions for judgment,
which are tied not to any particular juror’s actual beliefs, but rather to the
objective reasonable juror standard. It is difficult to imagine a court excluding
50 See, e.g., Edward K. Cheng, Reconceptualizing the Burden of Proof, 122 YALE L.J. 1254, 1267 n.
24, 1268, 1275 (2013) (arguing that, although it may be inaccurate “as a matter of inference” to set
prior odds to 1, it is reflective of what courts do in practice); Posner, supra note 8, at 1514 (“Ideally
we want the trier of fact to work from prior odds of 1 to 1 that the plaintiff or prosecutor has a
meritorious case. A substantial departure from this position, in either direction, marks the trier of
fact as biased.”).
51 Edward K. Cheng & Michael S. Pardo, Accuracy, Optimality and the Preponderance Standard,
14 L. PROB. & RISK 193, 207 (2015) (describing result from a particular Gaussian model of noise that
the minimax solution in that model yields the functional equivalent of prior odds of 1).
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for cause a juror who walks into the courtroom with no lean in favor of either
side; imagine how the eventual appeal would go if a judge excused a juror for
not leaning heavily enough toward one side.
Accordingly, except where explicitly noted, I will assume a reasonable
juror could have overall unconditional odds equal to 1 for the balance of this
Article.52 This means that a reasonable juror could have conditional odds
equal to her Bayes factor. Thus, for purposes of motions for judgment, the
Bayesian hypothesis testing problem reduces to one of analyzing the Bayes
factor. I do that analysis in Section I.D in connection with the plaintiff ’s most
favorable juror. First, though, I address the question of whether the Bayesian
hypothesis testing framework is appropriate to begin with.
C. Why Bayesian Hypothesis Testing is the Right Framework
For Legal Suffi ciency
Preponderance is the most common standard of proof in civil litigation.
This standard is often expressed as the requirement that it be “more probable
than not” that the plaintiff has proved her case. As the most recent version of
McCormick’s treatise elaborates:
The most acceptable meaning to be given to the expression, proof by a
preponderance, seems to be proof which leads the jury to find that the
existence of the contested fact is more probable than its nonexistence. Thus
the preponderance of evidence becomes the trier’s belief in the
preponderance of probability.53

This language maps directly onto notions of Bayesian posterior
probability, and much theory in evidence law over the several decades
following the late 1960s was founded on that idea.54 The Bayesian approach
proved controversial, and numerous scholars reject the idea that the
preponderance standard can or should be conceived in terms of
probabilities.55 The leading alternative is what Professor Ronald Allen and
52 I do discuss the possibility of cases in which the court believes such neutral priors are
unreasonable; see infra Section I.E.
53 2 KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 661 (Thomas Reuters 7th ed.
2013) (footnotes omitted). See also id. at 661 n.13. (citing cases).
54 According to Michael Risinger, the opening salvo in the “Bayes Wars” was fired by John
Kaplan in a 1968 law review article. See Michael Risinger, Introduction to Roger C. Park et al., Bayes
Wars Redivivus—An Exchange, 8 INT’L COMMENT. ON EVIDENCE 1, 1 (2010) (referring to the
“watershed article” by John Kaplan, Decision Theory and the Factfinding Process, 20 STAN. L. REV.
1065 (1968)).
55 For a decidedly partial list, see, e.g., Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Problematic
Value of Mathematical Models of Evidence, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 107, 135-37 (2007) (concluding that
“mathematical models do not very well capture the probative value of evidence”); L. Jonathan
Cohen, Subjective Probability and the Paradox of the Gatecrasher, 1981 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 627, 630, 633-34
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coauthors describe as relative plausibility of competing explanations.56
Professor Allen and Professor Michael Pardo write:
The two primary differences between our account and the more conventional
[Bayesian] probabilistic accounts are, first, the criteria that [are] central to
the fact-finding process (explanatory vs. probabilistic), and, second, whether
the proof process is characterized as comparative or not. Unlike the
conventional probabilistic accounts, the explanatory account is inherently
comparative—whether an explanation satisfies the standard will depend on
the strength of the possible explanations supporting each side. Under the
“preponderance of the evidence” standard, fact-finders determine whether
the best of the available explanations favors the plaintiff or the defendant.
The best available explanation will favor the plaintiff if it includes all of the
legal elements of the plaintiff ’s claim; it will favor the defendant when it fails
to include one [or] more elements.57

As this quotation hints, one basis for Professor Allen’s critique of the
Bayesian approach is the difficulty of knowing how to place probabilistic
numbers on propositions related to the elements plaintiffs must prove.58 The
comparative alternative that Professor Allen proposes is what is known in the
philosophy of science literature as “inference to the best.”59 According to this
approach:

(1981) (arguing that “the concept of probability that is implicit in the civil and criminal standards of
proof should not be regarded as . . . conforming to the axioms of the mathematical calculus of
chance” and that the only relevant indicator of reliability is “the weight of the evidence”); Haack,
supra note 7, at 47 (“[W]e can’t look to probability theory for an understanding of degrees and
standards of proof in the law . . . .”); Brian Leiter, Naturalized Epistemology and the Law of Evidence,
87 VA. L. REV. 1491, 1507-10 (2001) (discussing the practical difficulties with a Bayesian theory of
evidence); Lawrence Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV.
L. REV. 1329, 1377 (1971) (arguing that, with some possible exceptions, “the costs of attempting to
integrate mathematics into the factfinding process of a legal trial outweigh the benefits”).
56 See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen, Factual Ambiguity and a Theory of Evidence, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 604,
606-11 (1994); Ronald J. Allen, The Nature of Juridical Proof, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 373, 382-87 (1991);
Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, Explanations and the Preponderance Standard: Still Kicking Rocks
with Dr. Johnson, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 1579, 1580-81 (2018); Allen & Pardo, The Problematic Value
of Mathematical Models of Evidence, supra note 55, at 137; Michael S. Pardo & Ronald J. Allen, Juridical
Proof and the Best Explanation, 27 LAW & PHIL. 223, 223-26 (2008); Brian Leiter & Ronald J. Allen,
Naturalized Epistemology and the Law of Evidence, 87 VA. L. REV. 1491, 1427-37 (2001).
57 Allen & Pardo, Explanations and the Preponderance Standard, supra note 56, at 1581 (footnotes
omitted).
58 See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen, Burdens of Proof, 13 L. PROB. & RISK 195, 214-15 (2014) (discussing
the issues of applying burdens of persuasion to the individual elements of a plaintiff ’s claim); Leiter
& Allen, supra note 56, at 1507 (“The first worry [about using the Bayesian model] is computational
complexity, which raises the specter of violating ‘ought implies can.’”).
59 See PETER LIPTON, INFERENCE TO THE BEST EXPLANATION (1991) for a treatment in
the philosophy of science literature. As to Professor Allen’s application of the concept in evidence

570

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 168: 549

At trial, the parties . . . offer competing versions of events that, if true, would
explain the evidence presented at trial. Parties with the burdens of proof . . .
offer versions of events that include the formal elements that make up the
particular claims or defenses; opposing parties offer versions of events that
fail to include one or more of the formal elements . . . .
At the decision stage in civil cases where the burden of persuasion is a
preponderance of the evidence, proof depends on whether the best
explanation of the evidence favors the plaintiff or the defendant. Fact finders
decide based on the relative plausibility of the versions of events put forth by
the parties, and possibly additional ones constructed by themselves. Fact
finders infer the most plausible explanation as the actual explanation and find
for the party that the substantive law supports based on this accepted
version.60

The inference-to-the-best approach as advocated by Professor Allen
rejects the idea that individual jurors compute the conditional probability that
one side or the other is right, by averaging likelihood values over their prior
beliefs. Instead, inference to the best assumes that each juror determines
relative plausibility by “constructing narrative versions of events to account
for the evidence presented at trial based on criteria such as coherence,
completeness and uniqueness.”61 Then each juror compares the best account
in favor of each side and chooses the one that seems more plausible.
However convincing one finds that argument, there are good reasons why
my analysis in Part I, founded on Bayesian reasoning, still applies. First, even
if the claim is right that most jurors don’t actually act as Bayesians, that is quite
a different thing from establishing that a juror who did would be unreasonable.
After all, where it is feasible to use, Bayes’s theorem provides a coherent,
consistent, and rational way to update beliefs given new information.
Second, Bayes’s theorem is feasible to use when quantitative estimation
evidence is at issue. As I demonstrate in Section I.D, the assessment of
statistical estimation evidence is well suited to the use of Bayesian reasoning.
Professors Allen and Leiter surely are right that in most cases it is so difficult
to calculate the necessary likelihood values that as a general matter, the
method is at best heuristic in its value. But by construction, in the estimation
evidence context, we have quantitative evidence and need only evaluate it in
line with Bayesian reasoning. So Allen and Leiter’s argument that “ought
implies can”62 is undaunting in this important special case.
law scholarship, see, e.g., Allen, Burdens of Proof, supra note 58, at 216; Pardo & Allen, Juridical Proof
and the Best Explanation, supra note 56, at 223-24.
60 Allen, Burdens of Proof, supra note 58, at 216.
61 Id.
62 Leiter & Allen, Naturalized Epistemology and the Law of Evidence, supra note 56, at 1507.
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Third, Bayesian approaches can just as well be defined in terms of odds
as probability levels, as the discussion earlier in this Section shows. Professor
Edward Cheng not long ago made the same point, although he did not focus
on the problem of composite hypotheses.63 Professor Sean Sullivan has
argued compellingly that the inference-to-the-best approach can be
accommodated in a likelihood-based framework with composite hypotheses.64
Indeed, my analysis of the plaintiff’s most favorable juror in Section I.D bears
important similarities to Professor Sullivan’s.65 Thus Professor Sullivan’s
work implies that likelihood-based reasoning is not an alternative, but
actually a way to implement the comparative and inference-to-the-best aspects
of Professor Allen’s relative plausibility approach.
Finally, the language that courts use in discussing the preponderance
standard is so tied to probability talk that it would be odd to suggest there is
something wrong with using probabilistic reasoning when probability can be
meaningfully quantified. Courts and litigants regularly use the words
“probability” and “probable” in discussing preponderance. When they don’t,
they typically use “likelihood” or “likely” instead.66
Susan Haack argues to the contrary, pointing out that this language has
both an epistemic and a mathematical sense.67 For example, if I were to say,
“law review editors will probably hate my Article,” few people would puzzle
63 Cheng, supra note 50, at 1268. See also my comment on Allen & Pardo, supra note 24, Jonah B.
Gelbach, It’s all Relative: Explanationism and Probabilistic Evidence Theory, 23 INT’L J. EVIDENCE &
PROOF 168, 171 (2019) (commenting on the approaches taken by Professor Cheng and Professor Pardo).
64 Sean P. Sullivan, A Likelihood Story: The Theory of Legal Fact-Finding, 90 U. COLO. L. REV.
1, 38-39 (2019).
65 The numerator likelihood value for the plaintiff ’s most favorable juror is the best possible
value for the plaintiff, which is what Sullivan proposes to use. Sullivan’s denominator is the best
possible value for the defendant. My analysis does not require that the plaintiff ’s most favorable
juror use this value, because my approach requires only that I bound the Bayes factor for the
plaintiff ’s most favorable juror below rather than determine its exact value. Sullivan points out that
because his proposed ratio compares the best likelihood value for the plaintiff ’s case to the best
likelihood value for the defendant’s case, his ratio can be viewed as implementing the inference-tothe-best approach in a likelihood framework. In the statistics literature, Sullivan’s proposed ratio is
known as the generalized likelihood ratio, and recent work has demonstrated that it can usefully be
viewed as capturing key epistemic features of the inference-to-the-best philosophical approach. See
David R. Bickel, The Strength of Statistical Evidence For Composite Hypotheses: Inference to the Best
Explanation, 22 STATISTICA SINICA 1147, 1156 (2012) (noting that the “inference to the best
explanation stipulates that the simple hypothesis of highest explanatory power be inferred”); see also
Zhiwei Zhang & Bo Zhang, A Likelihood Paradigm for Clinical Trials, 7 J. STAT. THEORY & PRAC.
157, 160 (2013) (providing an alternative axiomatization that yields the generalized likelihood ratio
as a metric of the strength of evidence).
66 Here it useful to point out the equivalence of adopting the likelihoodist view of the
preponderance standard given my approach to the plaintiff ’s most favorable juror below, and
adopting the Bayesian view, given overall prior odds equal to 1. The two views yield the same
inferences for any data.
67 Haack, supra note 7, at 47-48.
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over where exactly in the interval [N,$] my belief about the implied
probability lies; people would just think I had low confidence, in the
colloquial sense of “confidence,” in my Article’s congeniality to student law
review editors.68 On the other hand, if I were to say “it is more probable that
a heads-biased coin will come up heads than tails,” most people would think
I meant that the mathematical chance of a heads exceeds 0.5. Haack’s
epistemic notion of probability is that it conveys degrees of “warrant,”
whereas mathematical probability conveys something potentially different.69
But the preponderance standard is virtually never expressed in terms of
“warrant,” “credibility,” “coherence,” or words other than “probability” or
“likelihood.” At least when quantifiable evidence is involved, we should be
open to understanding the preponderance standard in terms of mathematical
probability concepts.
Indeed, I suspect that much of the opposition to Bayesian decision theory
in evidence law is traceable to the fact that it is difficult to take mathematical
probability seriously as a practical means of summarizing evidence that cannot
be quantified. To be sure, that is most evidence. No one really knows how to
calculate the actual quantitative likelihood that there would be ice on a
sidewalk—either in the absence or the presence of due care taken by the
defendant.70 With non-statistical evidence, the Bayesian approach is thus at
most a useful heuristic model. But the present context is limited to elements
of a case involving statistical estimation evidence. In this Article, I develop a
theory specific to such evidence, and only as to those issues in a case at which
such evidence is directed.
For these purposes, Bayesian posterior probability works quite well.
Estimation evidence by its very nature fits perfectly within the Bayesian
paradigm, because its associated likelihoods are naturally quantifiable.
Indeed, much of probability theory was developed to make sense of the
behavior of (approximately) normal statistical estimators on which I focus in
this Article. So it is quite natural to conceive of statistical estimates in terms
68 Cf. SARAH MOSS, PROBABILISTIC KNOWLEDGE 50-53 (2018) (assuming that “credences”
of non-quantitatively describable events can be quantitatively expressed). I note that Moss addresses
legal proof in one chapter of her book in a way that may be consistent with my Bayesian approach;
a detailed treatment of her discussion is beyond the scope of the present Article.
69 Id.
70 As Leiter and Allen write:

The first worry [about using the Bayesian model] is computational complexity, which
raises the specter of violating “ought implies can.” A huge and complicated data set is
involved at most trials, even most “simple” trials. No computer, let alone any human,
has the computational capacity to do the calculations necessary for the operation of
Bayes’ Theorem in a reasonable amount of time.
Leiter & Allen, supra note 56, at 1507.
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of probability theory—and thus in terms of Bayesian probability theory—in
the litigation context.
None of that proves mathematical probability, rather than Haack’s notion
of “warrant,” better captures the law’s object in phrases like “more probable
than not.” To be clear, Haack’s position is that nothing could prove such a
proposition. But it is difficult to conceive of a conceptual framework that
would better capture the spirit of the law’s language when estimation
evidence is at issue.
To put it differently, when the evidence itself is appropriately described
in mathematically probabilistic terms, what could provide a better
understanding of “warrant” than mathematical probability itself? To disagree
would require accepting that there are warranted propositions whose
mathematical odds are less than 1, and also that there are unwarranted
propositions whose mathematical odds exceed 1.71 That seems like a strange
notion of “warrant.” My position that we should use Bayesian posterior
probability to understand what “probable” means in legal standards when
using statistical estimation evidence is aptly captured by the epigram opening
Haack’s Legal Probabilism chapter—a quote attributed to Bertrand Russell:
“[T]he rational [person], who attaches to each proposition the right degree of
credibility, will be guided by the mathematical theory of probability when it
is applicable.”72
Finally, a conceptual strength of my approach is that although it is built
on the Bayesian foundation, its account of black-letter law is sufficient to
eliminate prior beliefs from consideration with respect to the procedural
milestones of litigation on which I focus here. My argument is not a result of
claims about the relative costs of Type I and Type II errors73 (other than
insofar as those claims have led courts to adopt the preponderance standard
in the first place).74 Nor does it require all or most jurors to be self-conscious
71 Suppose one collected together all the warranted and unwarranted positions of this type. If
the number is small, then there is little harm in ignoring the few propositions that have this type. If
instead the number is large, then applying an appropriate law of large numbers would yield the
result that a greater share of warranted propositions are false than true, and a greater share of
unwarranted propositions are true than false. And nothing in this argument requires anyone to know
which propositions are true or false; its result follows from its premises regardless of what is
observable. The only way out is to assume that probabilities of truth simply don’t exist.
72 Haack, supra note 7, at 47 (quoting BERTRAND RUSSELL, HUMAN KNOWLEDGE, ITS
SCOPE AND LIMITS 381 (1948)).
73 In the present context, a Type I error entails concluding that the plaintiff ’s claim is true when
in fact it is the defendant’s position that’s correct; a Type II error entails switching the parties in that
statement—so that the error is concluding the defendant is right when in fact the plaintiff is.
74 See, e.g., Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979) (noting that “[s]ince society has a
minimal concern with the outcome of such private suits, plaintiff ’s burden of proof is a mere
preponderance of the evidence. The litigants thus share the risk of error in roughly equal fashion”);
see also Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 390 (1983) (citing Addington and noting
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Bayesians, or to be instructed on the intricacies of Bayesian reasoning.75
Rather, it is the result of reasoning anchored in black-letter procedural law—
specifically, about what beliefs could be held by a particular set of juries that I
have argued would be reasonable in general.
D. The Fundamental Default Rule Results from Viewing the Evidence in the
Light Most Favorable to the Non-Movant
In this Section I make the case for the fundamental default rule that
statistical estimation evidence is legally sufficient under the preponderance
standard whenever it points in favor of the party proffering it. For example,
consider a randomized controlled trial of a drug’s effects on incidence of a
disease. If the disease is more frequently observed in the treatment group
than the control group, then according to the fundamental default rule the
evidence is legally sufficient to establish that the drug generally causes the
disease. In this Section, I develop the argument for this rule, which is much
more lenient than using statistical significance at conventional significance
levels.
My argument turns on what it means to view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff: to imagine a juror whose view of the evidence
leads the juror to place the highest reasonable posterior probability on the
plaintiff ’s litigation position. As I develop the argument, it will be useful to
refer to the data from the ASCOT-LLA study discussed above.
The discussion in Section I.B showed that the likelihood ratio—the ratio of
values of the likelihood function for two hypotheses of interest—determines
how a Bayesian person updates beliefs from priors to posteriors. For the
ASCOT-LLA data, Figure 1 plots the likelihood function under the
assumption that the t-statistic has a normal distribution.76 Under that
assumption, the likelihood function is the same as a normal probability
the same); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371–72 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (describing how the
preponderance standard is appropriate because “we view it as no more serious in general for there
to be an erroneous verdict in the defendant’s favor than for there to be an erroneous verdict in the
plaintiff ’s favor”).
75 Cf. Michael O. Finkelstein & William B. Fairley, A Bayesian Approach to Identification
Evidence, 83 HARV. L. REV. 489, 502 (1970) (“An expert witness could explain to jurors that their
view of the statistical evidence should depend on their view of the other evidence. He might then
suggest a range of hypothetical unconditional probabilities, specifying the posterior probability
associated with each unconditional. Each juror could then pick the unconditional estimate that most
closely matched his own view of the evidence.”).
76 It is common knowledge among statisticians that in a large sample, this distributional
assumption can be justified by appeal to central limit theory. That theory establishes that in a large
enough sample, the distribution of a sample proportion (such as type 2 diabetes incidence) is
practically indistinguishable from the normal distribution. See Kaye & Freedman, supra note 9, at
276-278 and citations therein for more on the central limit theorem.

2020]

Estimation Evidence

575

density function (familiarly known as the bell curve) with mean equal to 1.2
(the observed value of the t-statistic) and variance equal to 1.77 This is useful
because that function’s precise form is known, which allows us to investigate
its properties with particularity using Figure 1.
The figure’s horizontal axis measures different possible values for the true
mean of the t-statistic’s distribution. The vertical axis tells us the likelihood
of the x-axis value for the t-statistic’s mean. Recall that the t-statistic is the
difference in type 2 diabetes incidence divided by the estimated standard
error of this difference. Thus each value on the x-axis corresponds to a
particular true impact of Lipitor on type 2 diabetes incidence, expressed in
units of standard error.

77 The likelihood function is formally defined in terms of the conditional density of the full set
of observed data, not just some estimator of interest. However, often in litigation the only feature
of the data that is of interest is an estimator, or its associated t-statistic, as with the ASCOT-LLA
study and the Lipitor litigation. When the estimator in question is the maximum likelihood
estimator (MLE), as is also true with the ASCOT-LLA data, it has been demonstrated that largesample results related to the likelihood are functionally equivalent to those that would be obtained
if the full-data likelihood function were used. Lemma 3.1 of Tsung-Shan Tsou & Richard M. Royall,
Robust Likelihoods, 90 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N. 316, 319 (1995).
In some cases, it’s necessary to use an estimator other than the MLE. For example, antitrust
litigation often turns on the value of a multiple regression coefficient. Experts estimating such
models are often unwilling to assume complete knowledge of the conditional density of their
unobserved components. In important circumstances, a feasible “robust” estimator will be
available to consistently estimate the coefficient of interest. Such estimators are usually
asymptotically normal, so that their large-sample distribution differs from the MLE only in terms
of variance. Working with the t-statistic eliminates this difference, so that Tsou and Royall’s
Lemma 3.1, id., applies.
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Figure 1: The Likelihood Function Associated with the
ASCOT-LLA Data

Consider two jurors who both place prior probability one-half on the
plaintiff ’s litigation position as a whole (i.e., they have overall prior odds
equal to 1).
• Juror A puts all prior probability, within the plaintiff ’s litigation
position, on the simple hypothesis that the true mean of the tstatistic equals the observed value of 1.2. Juror A’s Average
Likelihood of 𝐻𝐻$ from equation (2) thus equals the maximum of the
likelihood function, which is roughly 0.4. This juror’s belief is
represented by the point labeled “Max” in Figure 1‘s plot of the
likelihood function for the ASCOT-LLA data.
• Juror B puts equal probability on the simple hypothesis that the tstatistic’s true mean is 1.2 and the simple hypothesis that Lipitor
increases type 2 diabetes incidence by enough to cause the t-statistic’s
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true mean to equal 1.6.78 The latter point is indicated by “P” in
Figure 1. Thus Juror B’s Average Likelihood of 𝐻𝐻$ is the average of
0.4 and 0.37, which works out to 0.385.
Obviously Juror A’s view of the evidence is more favorable to the plaintiff
than is Juror B’s. Indeed, in this instance Juror A is the most favorable juror
the plaintiff could get, in terms of the juror’s prior beliefs about pro-plaintiff
values of the t-statistic’s mean. For this reason, Juror A is the plaintiff ’s most
favorable juror.79 At the summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law
stages of litigation, a non-moving plaintiff is entitled to have the court view
the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. This means the
plaintiff is entitled to have the court assume that the jury would be composed
of twelve copies of the plaintiff ’s most favorable juror. It follows that the
numerator of the Bayes factor equals the maximum possible likelihood, when
the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. When the
t-statistic is normally distributed, this will always be the value of the normal
density at its maximum, as depicted by point “Max” in Figure 1.80
Now consider the denominator of the Bayes factor—the Average
Likelihood of 𝐻𝐻N . Figure 1 shows that the greatest value of the likelihood
function among all defendant-favoring hypotheses occurs where the true
mean of the t-statistic is 0, depicted by “D”, for a value is roughly 0.19. The
worst-case scenario for the plaintiff is that jurors place all defendant-favoring
prior probability on this point. In other words, no matter what the jurors’
prior beliefs are over defendant-favoring hypotheses, the Average Likelihood
of 𝐻𝐻S can’t be more than 0.19.
Thus we have seen that in the case of the ASCOT-LLA data:
• A juror who views the evidence in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff would have a Bayes factor numerator equal to 0.4.
• No juror could have a Bayes factor denominator greater than 0.19.
It follows immediately that a juror who views the evidence in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff must have a Bayes factor at least equal to the
ratio of 0.4 to 0.19, or 2.1. Using equation (2) with overall unconditional odds
set to 1, the conditional odds in favor of the plaintiff’s litigation position are
2.1 for a reasonable juror who views the evidence in the light most favorable
78 Given the standard error estimated here, a t-statistic true mean of 1.6 corresponds to an
increase of about 20% in the actual probability of type 2 diabetes onset.
79 This concept was introduced in Gelbach & Kobayashi, supra note 25, at 16.
80 Even when the t-statistic’s distribution is not exactly normal, the fundamental default rule
derived below often will follow. It is easy to show that it holds whenever the t-statistic has a
distribution that has a single local maximum and is increasing to the left of that maximum. A nonnormal distribution with this property is the Student’s t distribution with fixed degrees of freedom.
This distribution has the shape just described but has “fatter tails” than the normal distribution. In
sum, what’s important about the normal density for purposes of the fundamental default rule is just
its overall shape, rather than its particular percentiles.
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to the plaintiff, given the ASCOT-LLA data. In other words, the plaintiff ’s
most favorable juror believes the plaintiff ’s litigation position is more than
twice as probable as the defendant’s. This hypothetical juror’s posterior
probability in favor of the plaintiff ’s litigation position is at least 68%, well in
excess of 50%-plus-a-feather’s-weight. To reject this result, one must:
(i) believe that only jurors whose prior beliefs substantially favor the
defendant are reasonable;81
(ii) believe that it is possible to view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff even while adopting prior beliefs that
are not the most favorable possible ones to the plaintiff;82 or
(iii) believe that the t-statistic’s actual distributional properties are
very different from those of the normal distribution.83

81 With Overall Unconditional Odds sufficiently less than 1/2.1, or roughly 0.48, the product
of the hypothetical juror’s prior odds and the Bayes factor would be less than 1.
82 In other words, rejecting Juror A described above in favor of one who places prior probability
on values of Lipitor’s type 2 diabetes incidence that are less favorable for the plaintiff.
83 Simple non-normality would not be enough to ruin the result. See supra note 80.
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Figure 2: Showing that the Argument Holds Generically

−

The argument above has important implications beyond the Lipitor
litigation and the ASCOT-LLA study. Nothing about this argument is tied
to the particular values observed in that study. Consider Figure 2. This figure
repeats the likelihood function for the ASCOT-LLA data, plotting it with a
thin line,84 whose maximum occurs where the t-statistic equals 1.2. It also
includes another likelihood function for the case in which the observed tstatistic is positive but lower. This likelihood function is plotted with thicker
ink.85 Its maximum point occurs closer to the vertical intercept than does the
maximum for the ASCOT-LLA data’s likelihood function.
As with the ASCOT-LLA data, the value of this hypothetical likelihood
function is maximized for a positive observed t-statistic value. Once again
this means the best story for the plaintiff has a greater likelihood function
84
85

This line is blue for those reading in color.
This line is red for those reading in color.
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value (at point “Max”) than the best case for the defendant (at point “D”).
The picture is qualitatively the same for any positive value of the observed tstatistic. Thus it follows that whenever the observed t-statistic is positive,
viewing the statistical estimation evidence in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff will yield a likelihood ratio that must be greater than one. Assuming
that a reasonable juror could be neutral toward the parties, prior odds of 1 are
reasonable. Accordingly, viewing the statistical estimation evidence in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff yields posterior odds greater than 1—and
thus a posterior probability in favor of the plaintiff above one-half—whenever
the observed t-statistic is positive. This shows that when the plaintiff must
prove a variable exceeds zero, the plaintiff ’s statistical estimation evidence
meets the preponderance standard whenever the observed t-statistic is
positive. It is easy to generalize this result to all cases in which (i) the plaintiff
must prove that a variable of interest exceeds some specified value,86 or (ii)
the plaintiff must prove that a variable of interest falls short of some specified
value.87 This yields the fundamental default rule:
When estimation evidence points in the plaintiff ’s direction, this evidence is
legally suffi cient to meet the preponderance standard.
Thus, the ASCOT-LLA evidence as to a 10mg dose of Lipitor is legally
sufficient. The data indicated that in the ASCOT-LLA trial, the observed
type 2 diabetes incidence was greater in the treatment group, whose members
received Lipitor, than in the placebo group. That is enough for legal
sufficiency, thanks to the procedural rule that courts must view the evidence
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff on a motion for judgment.

86 Let 𝜃𝜃 be the true value of the variable of interest, e.g., the true effect of Lipitor on type 2
diabetes incidence, and let 𝜃𝜃U be an available estimator of this effect. Suppose the plaintiff must show
that the true effect exceeds some minimum value 𝑀𝑀, which might not be zero. Define 𝜆𝜆 = 𝜃𝜃 − 𝑀𝑀;
this is a “re-centered” version of 𝜃𝜃. Proving that 𝜃𝜃 > 𝑀𝑀 is the same as proving 𝜆𝜆 > N. Further,
defining 𝜆𝜆Y = 𝜃𝜃U − 𝑀𝑀, the event that 𝜃𝜃U > 𝑀𝑀 is the same as the event that 𝜆𝜆Y > N. Because 𝑀𝑀 is a
constant, the variance of 𝜆𝜆Y is the same as the variance of 𝜃𝜃U , so any consistent estimator 𝜎𝜎" for the
square-root of 𝑉𝑉\𝜃𝜃U] is also consistent for 𝑉𝑉\𝜆𝜆Y]. It follows that all the analysis above applies to the
t-statistic based on re-centering, i.e., 𝑇𝑇!" = 𝜆𝜆Y/𝜎𝜎".
87 Using the same definitions as in supra note 86, the plaintiff must now prove that 𝜃𝜃 < 𝑀𝑀.
Define 𝜆𝜆 = −(𝜃𝜃 − 𝑀𝑀); this is a “re-centered” and “re-signed” version of 𝜃𝜃. Proving that 𝜃𝜃 < 𝑀𝑀 is
the same as proving 𝜆𝜆 > N, and the rest of the argument from supra note 86 goes through.
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E. Conventional Hypothesis Testing Leads to an Inappropriate Rule for
Determining Legal Suffi ciency of Statistical Estimation Evidence,
Unless the Significance Level of 50% is Used
In this Section, I show that in determining legal sufficiency, using
conventional hypothesis testing at scholarly levels of significance leads to a
too-demanding standard. I then show that there is a neat identity between
the fundamental default rule and conventional hypothesis testing, so long as
the 50% significance level is used. Thus, a court that wants to take the legal
standard for sufficiency seriously, rather than unquestioningly applying
scholarly standards in litigation, may act as if conventional hypothesis testing
is appropriate, provided that it applies the appropriate significance level of
50 percent—much less demanding than scholarly levels often used now.
I now analyze the standard that plaintiffs must meet if a court uses
conventional hypothesis testing. Gelbach and Kobayashi (2018) derive a
minimum value for the posterior probability in favor of the plaintiffs for the
plaintiff ’s most favorable juror.88 Their calculations show that using
conventional hypothesis testing with the most common significance level, 5%,
is tantamount to requiring the plaintiff to present evidence powerful enough
to convince the plaintiff ’s most favorable juror that there is at least a 79%
chance the plaintiff’s litigation position is correct. With more demanding
choices, such as requiring a t-statistic of at least 1.96, that figure rises to 87%.89
Obviously these figures far exceed the 50%-plus-a-feather’s-weight threshold
implied by the preponderance standard.
Figure 3 graphs the minimum probability standard the plaintiff must meet
implied by various significance levels. The top row of labels on the horizontal
axis shows the significance level, and the bottom level shows the
corresponding t-statistic (e.g., a significance level of 5% corresponds to a t88

Gelbach & Kobayashi, supra note 25. They do so by using the fact that the plaintiff ’s most

favorable juror’s likelihood ratio is always at least as great as the likelihood ratio based on comparing
the maximum likelihood value to the value of the likelihood function under the assumption that the
t-statistic’s true mean is 0. Id. at 5. They then use the assumption that the plaintiff ’s most favorable
juror could reasonably have prior overall odds at least equal to 1, i.e., not be non-neutral in a way
that disfavors the plaintiff. Id. at 7. Then the plaintiff ’s most favorable juror’s posterior odds are at
least as great as the likelihood ratio comparing the hypothesis that the t-statistic’s true mean equals
the observed t-statistic value to the hypothesis that the t-statistic’s true mean is zero. Id. Gelbach &
Kobayashi show that when the value of the observed t-statistic, 𝑇𝑇U, is positive, this likelihood ratio is
$
𝐿𝐿∗ = 𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 b 𝑇𝑇U % c; when the observed t-statistic is negative, the likelihood ratio instead is 𝐿𝐿∗ =
%

$
𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 b− 𝑇𝑇U %c. Given overall prior odds equal to 1, the posterior probability can be shown to equal
%

𝐿𝐿∗ /($ + 𝐿𝐿∗ ), so this is a lower bound on the posterior probability in favor of the plaintiff held by
the plaintiff ’s most favorable juror.
89 Requiring a t-statistic of at least 1.96 implies that the significance level is 2.5%; this figure
is commonly used by experts who incorrectly use two-sided testing. See supra note 39.
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statistic of 1.65). This figure reveals an important fact about the relationship
between conventional hypothesis testing and the fundamental default rule
derived in Section I.D. An expert who set the significance level to 50% would
exactly implement the preponderance standard with the evidence viewed in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Any more demanding significance
level (i.e., any level less than 50%) is more demanding than the preponderance
standard’s 50%, whereas any significance level above 50% yields a less
demanding standard. The t-statistic of 1.2 corresponds to a significance level
of 0.115 (the p-value for the ASCOT-LLA data), and a posterior probability
in favor of the plaintiff of nearly 70%, as discussed above.
Figure 3: Conventional Significance Level and Plaintiff’s Most Favorable
Juror’s Minimum Posterior Probability in Favor of the Plaintiff

Figure 3 shows starkly that for an expert using conventional hypothesis
testing to follow the preponderance standard test for legal sufficiency, while
viewing estimation evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,

2020]

Estimation Evidence

583

requires that the expert use a significance level of 50%. Thus, we can view
conventional hypothesis testing as an appropriate method at the legal
sufficiency stage as long as the significance level of 50% is used.
It follows that courts may reasonably rely on the testimony of an expert
who self-consciously declares that he is testing for statistical significance at
the 50% level. I am aware of two cases in which experts have done just this in
the context of challenges to the admissibility of expert testimony.90 These
cases did not involve legal sufficiency as such; the issue posed was
admissibility under Rule 702.91 As I shall discuss below, though, the proper
role of judicial gatekeeping of the strength of statistical estimation evidence
for admissibility purposes is the same as it is for legal sufficiency purposes.
In each of the two cases in which an expert announced his reliance on the 50%
significance level, the court properly allowed the testimony.92
It is useful to offer an additional framing of the fundamental default rule
in terms of the p-value, because hypothesis testing results often are presented
in that form (see discussion at the end of Section I.A). We have seen that the
fundamental default rule is equivalent to conventional hypothesis testing with
a significance level of 50%. It follows that the fundamental default rule may
equivalently be understood as stating that estimation evidence is legally
sufficient whenever the p-value is less than 0.5.93
Throughout this discussion, I have assumed that the plaintiff’s most
favorable juror could reasonably have overall prior odds equal to one. What
if that were unreasonable in a case? For example, what if the court were sure
90 In re High-Tech Emp. Antitrust Litig., No. 11-02509, 2014 WL 1351040, at *12 n.25 (N.D.
Cal. Apr. 4, 2014); In re Photochromic Lens Antitrust Litig., No. 10-00984, 2014 WL 1338605, at
*25-27 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 3, 2014).
91 In re High-Tech Emp., 2014 WL 1351040, at *12 n.25; In re Photochromic Lens, 2014 WL 1338605,
at *25-27.
92 See In re High-Tech Emp., 2014 WL 1351040, at *12 n.25 (“Dr. Leamer may testify to . . . the
fact that his alternative conduct regression model’s conduct coefficients pass the 50% level ‘suggests
that it is more likely than not that the compensation of employees were decreased during the period
of the agreements.’”); see also In re Photochromic Lens, 2014 WL 1338605, at *26-27 (approving the use
of a significance level of .50 because the testifying expert economist justified the approach on the
basis of Type II error probabilities, and also because the opposing expert failed to justify rejecting
that approach except because it was “simply out of bounds of what economists do”).
93 I emphasize that this conclusion is not an instance of the oft-seen fallacy of equating the pvalue with a posterior probability. For example, Kaye & Freedman rightly point out that it is
generally mistaken to interpret the p-value as “the probability that defendants are innocent,” because
the p-value “merely represents the probability of ” rejecting the null hypothesis when it is correct, so
that it is true, in general, that “a p-value less than 50% does not demonstrate a preponderance of the
evidence against the null hypothesis.” Kaye & Freedman, supra note 9, at 271 n.138. I have not made
that argument. Instead, I have provided a distinct argument showing that any p-value below 0.5 is
sufficient for the plaintiff ’s most favorable juror to believe the plaintiff ’s story is more probable than
the defendant’s. To see the distinction, observe that a juror with overall prior odds of ½ would
require a much lower p-value than 0.5 to reach this conclusion. See infra note 94 (explaining that a
p-value less than or equal to 0.119 would be needed in that case).
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that a plaintiff could not possibly have overall prior odds greater than some
number Z? If Z were less than one, then as a matter of law the plaintiff ’s most
favorable juror would have to have a more skeptical view of the plaintiff ’s case
before seeing the statistical estimation evidence. That means that for any
observed value of the statistical estimation evidence, the more skeptical
plaintiff ’s most favorable juror would have a lower posterior probability than
what the fundamental default rule would indicate. Accordingly, the plaintiff’s
most favorable juror would find the plaintiff ’s position more probable than
the defendant’s only if the statistical estimation evidence were stronger than
the fundamental default rule requires. How much stronger depends on how
skeptical the plaintiff ’s most favorable juror would have to be to be
reasonable.94 Nothing in my statistical argument precludes a court from
adopting such a view. All my approach requires is that the court be able to
articulate a value for Z, the upper bound on the overall prior odds for the
plaintiff ’s most favorable juror.95
F. Summary of Legal Suffi ciency and the Preponderance Standard
In this Section of the Article, I started by reviewing conventional
hypothesis testing, showing that it maps poorly onto the preponderance
standard typically used in civil litigation when scholarly significance levels
are used. I then explained how the Bayesian hypothesis testing alternative
provides a snug fit to the preponderance standard. I argued that the primary
obstacle to this Bayesian approach, the subjectivity of priors, can be hurdled
when the question at bar is legal sufficiency—as on a motion for summary
judgment or judgment as a matter of law.
In that circumstance, what matters is what the plaintiff ’s most favorable
juror reasonably would believe. I take that question in two steps. First, if it
94

For example, if Z=1/2, then the plaintiff ’s most favorable juror must start out thinking the

defendant is twice as likely as the plaintiff to be right. Then the generalized likelihood ratio would
have to be at least 2 for the plaintiff ’s most favorable juror’s posterior odds to exceed one—so that
it takes considerably stronger evidence to convince the jury to find for the plaintiff than with a
plaintiff ’s most favorable juror who has overall prior odds of 1. Using the formula above, that for a
$

positive t-statistic the generalized likelihood ratio equals 𝐿𝐿 = exp h 𝑇𝑇 %i, a generalized likelihood
%
ratio of 2 would require a t-statistic of roughly 1.18. Treating the t-statistic as having approximately
a standard normal distribution, the p-value associated with a t-statistic of 1.18 is 0.119. Thus if the
plaintiff ’s most favorable juror starts out thinking the defendant is twice as likely as the plaintiff to
be right, she will continue to think so unless the statistical estimation evidence is statistically
significant at level 11.9 percent or lower.
95 Similarly, the court could take the view that Z is greater than one, in which case the
plaintiff ’s most favorable juror would find the plaintiff ’s case more probable even with some
values of the generalized likelihood ratio less than 1 (meaning, evidence that nominally points
in the defendant’s favor).
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would be reasonable for jurors to believe the parties are equally likely to be
right—i.e., if a juror with equal overall priors would not be excluded for
cause—then a juror may reasonably have overall prior odds of 1. That
observation allows us to focus attention on the Bayes factor. Although this is
a ratio of likelihood function values averaged over priors, our interest in the
plaintiff ’s most favorable juror allows us to treat the generalized likelihood
ratio as the appropriate value of the Bayes factor. This generalized likelihood
ratio has a simple form when the statistical estimation evidence involves an
approximately (or exactly) normally distributed random variable, as can
usually be shown to be the case.
It is a short additional step to the fundamental default rule, according to
which statistical estimation evidence that points in the direction of the
proffering party is legally sufficient. Where it applies, the fundamental
default rule turns out to be equivalent to using conventional hypothesis
testing at the 50 percent significance level—or, what is the same, finding for
the plaintiff whenever the p-value is less than 0.5. Thus, even though
conventional hypothesis testing is not generally an appropriate way to
implement the preponderance standard, it is appropriate if the correct
significance level is used.96
II. HOW TO ANALYZE ADMISSIBILITY OF STATISTICAL ESTIMATION
EVIDENCE UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES
AND ASSOCIATED CASE LAW
Estimation evidence typically enters a trial record through expert
testimony.97 This Part discusses how the Federal Rules of Evidence and associated
case law properly apply to expert testimony about estimation evidence.
The first consideration is relevance under Rule 401. This rule states that
evidence is relevant if “it has any tendency to make a fact” that is consequential
to the action’s outcome “more or less probable than it would be without the
evidence.”98 As with the preponderance standard, such language is catnip to
the Bayesian. It refers directly to how “probable” a fact is, with and “without
the evidence.” It is tailor-made for expression in formal terms, because
Bayesian reasoning implies that evidence E as to fact F is relevant if and only
if F’s conditional probability given E differs from its unconditional probability.
In terms of equation (2), this is equivalent to saying that the evidence is
associated with a Bayes factor different from 1, so that the Bayesian fact
96 If it would be unreasonable for jurors to have neutral priors toward the parties, then the
fundamental default rule doesn’t apply, but it may be appropriately adjusted. See supra note 94.
97 In general, FED. R. EVID. 801 makes writings describing the results of statistical study
hearsay, and therefore presumptively inadmissible.
98 FED. R. EVID. 401.
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finder changes her beliefs. As Professor David Kaye has noted, the link
between the language of Rule 401 and simple Bayesian ideas was first
pointed out by Richard Lempert in 1977,99 though the idea dates at least to
John Maynard Keynes.100
As with the preponderance standard, the idea that Bayesian posterior
probability provides a useful framework for relevance under Rule 401 has
been controversial.101 But it shouldn’t be. Professor Bruce Hay has pointed
out that in a jury trial case, “a judge doesn’t have to . . . decide whether (she
thinks) a piece of evidence makes a fact more or less likely; rather, she has
to decide whether a reasonable trier of fact might consider it to have that
effect.”102 This is a natural understanding of what it means to say that a
piece of evidence has “any tendency” to make a consequential fact more or
less probable. Although one might agree with Professor Allen and coauthors
that reasonable jurors need not be Bayesians, it is difficult to see how a juror
who processes information into conditional and unconditional probabilities
in the way that Bayes’s Theorem counsels—when it is possible to do so—
thereby would be unreasonable. Thus, it is appropriate to regard differing
conditional and unconditional probabilities as a sufficient condition for
relevance under Rule 401.
This conclusion complements the results from Part I. The plaintiff ’s most
favorable juror has different conditional and unconditional odds when
estimation evidence points in the plaintiff ’s direction. That is enough to make
a consequential fact more likely under the preponderance standard. So, it is
enough for relevance under Rule 401.103

99 Richard O. Lempert, Modeling
100 Park et al., supra note 54, at

Relevance, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1021, 1025-26 (1977).
8 (message from David Kaye, citing Richard Lempert, 75
MICH. L. REV. 1021 (1977), and J. M. KEYNES, A TREATISE ON PROBABILITY 55 (1921)).
101 For a recent demonstration, see the back-and-forth between Ronald J. Allen, Samuel Gross,
Bruce Hay, David Kaye, Michael Pardo, Roger Park, and Michael Risinger in Park et al., supra note
54, at 10-20.
102 Park et al., supra note 54, at 19. To be precise, whether the judge should make this finding
by a preponderance or, in line with Hay’s suggestion, determine whether a reasonable jury could
find it, depends on whether “the relevance of evidence depends on whether a fact exists.” FED. R.
EVID. 104(b); Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 690 (1988) (stating that to decide whether
a Rule 104(b) is satisfied, “the trial court neither weighs credibility nor makes a finding that the
[proponent] has proved the conditional fact by a preponderance of the evidence,” but instead “simply
. . . decides whether the jury could reasonably find the conditional fact . . . by a preponderance of
the evidence.”)
103 This result is congenial to the position of Michael D. Green and Joseph Sanders, who argue
that “most admissibility decisions regarding expert testimony are best thought of as sufficiency
judgments about the scientific evidence supporting the expert’s testimony,” although their reasons
differ from mine. Michael D. Green & Joseph Sanders, Admissibility Versus Suffi ciency: Controlling the
Quality of Expert Witness Testimony, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1057, 1058 (2015).
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I turn now to Rule 702, the second consideration related to
admissibility.104 Rule 702, as elaborated by Daubert, Joiner, and Kumho Tire,
and as amended in 2000 following the trilogy,105 provides a set of
considerations for determining whether expert testimony is admissible. The
text of Rule 702 requires expert witnesses to have expertise arising from
“knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.”106 I take it as given that
the testifying expert has appropriate qualifications in statistical methodology,
as the concepts underlying my argument ultimately are quite basic ones in
the theory of statistics and probability. As Rule 702 is now written, such an
expert may testify if the conditions of four subdivisions are satisfied.
Subdivisions (a), (c), and (d) are best understood through a discussion of
the Daubert trilogy, which I undertake momentarily. As for Rule 702(b), it
requires that “the testimony [be] based on sufficient facts or data.”107 The
Committee Note to the 2000 Amendment explains that the phrase “sufficient
facts or data” adverts to “a quantitative rather than qualitative analysis.”108 As
one treatise puts it, Rule 702(b) raises the question of “whether the expert
considered enough information to make the proffered opinion reliable,”109 or
“whether the expert ignored a significant portion of seemingly important
data,” as when “an expert ‘cherry picks’ favorable data in this manner but
ignores a significant quantity of other important facts . . ..”110 Thus an expert
should consider multiple studies, if more than one exists. I show how to
incorporate statistical evidence from multiple studies in the Appendix.
The remainder of this Part engages Rule 702 (Section II.A) and its proper
application to estimation evidence (Section II.B).
A. Reliability Under Rule 702 and the Daubert Trilogy
Reliability entered the Rule 702 lexicon with Daubert,111 which stated that
“under the Rules the trial judge must ensure that any and all scientific
testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.”112 Justice
104 Some scholars argue that Rule 702 is unnecessary, or at least ill-justified. See generally
Frederick Schauer & Barbara A. Spellman, Is Expert Evidence Really Different?, 89 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1 (2013). I take the law as it exists, while also acknowledging the strength of their arguments.
105 The Rule was also amended for style in 2011. See FED. R. EVID. APP’X at 349,
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2011-title28/pdf/USCODE-2011-title28-appfederalru-dup2.pdf [https://perma.cc/25PR-F6DX].
106 FED. R. EVID. 702.
107 FED. R. EVID. 702(b).
108 FED. R. EVID. 702 committee notes to 2000 amendment.
109 29 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 6268, at 318 (2d ed. 1987).
110 Id. at 320.
111 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
112 Id. at 589.
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Blackmun’s opinion explained that in cases “involving scientific evidence,
evidentiary reliability will be based on scientific validity,” which the Court
equated with “trustworthiness.”113 Justice Blackmun explained that the
requirement that expert testimony “‘assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue’ . . . goes primarily to relevance.”114
In addition, Justice Blackmun offered an alternative way to understand the
helpfulness requirement:
The study of the phases of the moon . . . may provide valid scientific
“knowledge” about whether a certain night was dark, and if darkness is a fact
in issue, the knowledge will assist the trier of fact. However (absent creditable
grounds supporting such a link), evidence that the moon was full on a certain
night will not assist the trier of fact in determining whether an individual was
unusually likely to have behaved irrationally on that night.115

Justice Blackmun summed up the idea here by stating that “Rule 702’s
‘helpfulness’ standard requires a valid scientific connection to the pertinent
inquiry as a precondition to admissibility.”116 The idea of a “valid scientific
connection to the pertinent inquiry” connects to what Justice Blackmun
characterized as “fit”117: scientific evidence that doesn’t seem to speak to the
questions at issue won’t be helpful.
The Daubert Court declined to provide a bright-line rule for reliability.
Instead, it listed several criteria that might inform the reliability inquiry as
to the method underpinning an expert’s testimony: (1) “whether it can be
(and has been) tested”;118 (2) “whether the theory or technique has been
subjected to peer review and publication”;119 (3) where possible, “the known
or potential rate of error”;120 (4) “the existence and maintenance of standards
controlling the technique’s operation”;121 and (5) whether it is possible to
“identif[y] a relevant scientific community and an express determination of a
particular degree of acceptance within that community.”122 These are only
possible criteria; as both Daubert and amended Rule 702 emphasize, they need

113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122

Id. at 590 n.9 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 591.
Id.
Id. at 591-92.
Id.
Id. at 593.
Id.
Id. at 594.
Id.
Id. (quoting United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1238 (3d Cir. 1985)).
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not be apposite in every case.123 Responding to defendant Merrell Dow’s
“apprehension” about “a ‘free-for-all’ in which befuddled juries are
confounded by absurd and irrational pseudoscientific assertions,” the Court
declared, “In this regard respondent seems to us to be overly pessimistic about
the capabilities of the jury and of the adversary system generally. Vigorous
cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction
on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking
shaky but admissible evidence.”124
One key feature of Daubert was its separation of methodology and
conclusions.125 Scientifically reliable methods, it seemed, were the ticket
through Daubert’s gateway. But General Electric Co. v. Joiner seems to have
kicked over that applecart.126 Though the Court granted cert only about the
standard of review owed a district court’s admissibility decisions on appeal,127
Joiner appeared to swell the scope of district court discretion to exclude expert
testimony. Declaring that “conclusions and methodology are not entirely
distinct from one another,” Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion in Joiner
introduced the requirement that there must not be too wide an “analytical
gap” between the facts and data that form the inputs of an expert’s opinion
and the conclusions that are its output.128 Coupled with the abuse of
discretion standard that Joiner held would apply to appellate review,129 this
determination displayed the Supreme Court’s willingness to allow district
courts considerable discretion in deciding to exclude expert testimony.
In Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,130 the Supreme Court confronted the
question of whether the same gatekeeping principles apply when an expert’s
testimony will not involve scientific evidence.131 Citing the text of Rule 702,
which at the time (as now) referred not only to “scientific,” but also to
“technical, or other specialized knowledge,” Justice Breyer’s opinion held that
123 See FED. R. EVID. 702 committee notes to 2000 amendment (“Daubert set forth a nonexclusive checklist for trial courts to use in assessing the reliability of scientific expert testimony.”)
(emphasis added).
124 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595-596.
125 Id. at 594-595 (explaining that the “overarching subject” of the admissibility inquiry “is the
scientific validity and thus the evidentiary relevance and reliability—of the principles that underlie
a proposed submission,” and stating that the “focus, of course, must be solely on principles and
methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate”).
126 522 U.S. 136 (1996).
127 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at (i), Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (No. 96-188), 1996 WL 33414071.
128 Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146. Arguably, a wide Joiner “analytical gap” exists whenever there is a
lack of the “fit,” or “valid scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry,” required under Daubert—
and vice-versa. For all the fanfare about Joiner on this point, then, perhaps the gap between it and
Daubert is small.
129 Id. at 139.
130 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
131 Id. at 141-42.
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the gatekeeping requirement Daubert established for determining the
admissibility of scientific evidence applied as well to other forms of expert
evidence.132 Further, Justice Breyer explained that “[t]he objective of
[Daubert’s gatekeeping] requirement is to . . . make certain that an expert . . .
employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that
characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field.”133
Putting all this together, Rule 702 and the Daubert trilogy erect a variety
of hurdles to admissibility of expert testimony, over and above relevance as
Rule 401 defines it. The testimony must help the fact finder understand other
evidence or determine a fact. When it involves scientific evidence, the
testimony must be based on the use of methods that fit the issues the
testimony addresses. The conclusions embraced in the testimony must not
stray too far from those that a district court, operating within its usual
discretion, could think are fairly warranted by the facts and data used to draw
the conclusion. And the testimony must be founded on the same level of
intellectual rigor that is generally used outside the courtroom by those in the
testifying expert’s field of expertise.
B. Understanding the Concepts of Strength and Credibility of Estimation Evidence
In this Section, I analyze statistical estimation evidence in terms of the two
core aspects of evidence on which the law of evidence concentrates. First is
probativeness—how convincing the evidence in question will be, if it is
admitted. Second is reliability—how trustworthy the evidence is, such that the
evidence-law value of accuracy is not threatened by allowing jurors to draw such
inferences as a person might naturally draw from the evidence in question.
It is important to understand that statisticians sometimes use the same
words as evidence law commentators in different ways. Statistical experts do
not necessarily draw a clear line between what evidence law commentators
describe as probativeness and reliability. In particular, whereas in evidence
law “credible” links to reliability rather than probativeness, a statistical expert
who states that “credible evidence indicates X” might or might not mean the
same thing as one who states that “strong evidence indicates X.” In this
Section, I present a view that links “credibility” and “strength” of statistical
evidence respectively to reliability and probativeness in the evidence law
sense. This discussion is useful because although statistical experts usually are
Id. at 147, 158.
Id. at 152. As Justice Scalia’s brief concurrence illustrates, the Daubert trilogy cases were
decided against a backdrop of concern about the extent of made-up expertise in not-very-scientific
fields that have limited or no footprint outside of litigation. Id. at 159 (Scalia, J., concurring)
(“[D]iscretion to choose among reasonable means of excluding expertise that is fausse and science
that is junky”).
132
133
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able to understand each other via pragmatic context, to outsiders, it might be
unclear which notion is involved. Readers should keep in mind the particular
link I draw.
Most estimation evidence of interest can be discussed in terms of tstatistics.134 As discussed in Part I, a greater t-statistic indicates that the
plaintiff ’s most favorable juror will regard estimation evidence as more
strongly favoring the plaintiff. Experts using conventional hypothesis testing
also view higher t-statistics as stronger evidence against the null hypothesis.
Equivalently, because lower p-values correspond to t-statistics of lesser
magnitude, lower p-values indicate stronger estimation evidence. All of this
implies that the plaintiff ’s most favorable juror and experts using
conventional hypothesis testing will agree on the ranking of two pieces of
statistical estimation evidence: an estimate with a lower p-value provides
stronger evidence in favor of the plaintiff.
Nothing in the previous paragraph’s discussion related to whether the
estimation evidence came from a well-designed study. The role of p-values
and t-statistics is entirely distinct from that question. A poorly designed study
that has little to do with the question of interest can have an enormous tstatistic and thus provide strong evidence about some question—just as a
perfectly designed and conducted study might yield only quite weak
evidence, in the form of a t-statistic close to 0.
A thought experiment will help distinguish the qualities of strength and
credibility. Suppose all sides to a controversy (legal or not) are behind a veil
of ignorance as to the numerical results of a statistical study. After receiving
a description of the study’s methods—who is assigned which treatments or
placebos, how the data will be collected, how the effect at issue will be
measured—all sides to the controversy agree that the study is reasonably
designed. It seems beyond question that such a study would be credible for
purposes of the controversy involved. Because the criteria for credibility
could be stated without regard to the results, credibility in the reliability sense
of evidence law is distinct from the character of the results themselves. This
allows us to separate our analysis of the strength of estimation evidence and
the credibility of the underlying study.
134 To be sure, this is not generally the case when multiple parameters’ values are
simultaneously tested (in which case a combination of statistics usually forms the test statistic, e.g.,
via a 𝜒𝜒 % statistic). Nor is it the case in certain situations in which there is good reason to doubt
normality. See, e.g., Jonah B. Gelbach, Eric Helland & Jonathan Klick, Valid Inference in Single-Firm,
Single-Event Studies, 15 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 495, 498 (2013) (using “analytical arguments” in a
study “to illustrate the importance of normality of the distribution of excess returns for achieving
valid inference, even asymptotically”); Fisch, Gelbach & Klick, supra note 29, at 575 n. 126 (citing
Alon Brav & J.B. Heaton, Event Studies in Securities Litigation: Low Power, Confounding Effects, and
Bias, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 583, 591 n. 17 (2015)) (noting that standard practice is to rely on the
assumption of normality).
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Within the category of credibility, it is useful to further distinguish two
qualities: technical implementation and credibility for the proffered purpose.
1. Technical Implementation
Technical implementation concerns whether the statistical evidence in
question was calculated as it should have been, given the representations the
expert makes about the results.
An expert might accidentally forget to count some observed values in
calculating an average, might divide by the wrong number of observations,
and so on. Or, the data used to calculate the statistical evidence might have
been the result of data entry errors, with otherwise correct mathematical
formulas then applied to the contaminated data set. Statistical evidence
generated in such ways would be mechanically inaccurate; such inaccuracies
might or might not be important, depending on the context.135
A third problem arises when an expert estimates a model in a way that is
highly likely, if not guaranteed, to result in biased estimates.136 A fourth
example arises when an analyst engages in deliberate manipulation of data in
searching for a model specification that yields results in line with the analyst’s
pre-conceived idea of what the results should be.137
In all of these cases, many professional statisticians would be skeptical of
an expert’s analysis, even without knowing the specific results of the
estimation evidence.
2. Credibility for the Proffered Purpose
This subsection discusses credibility for the proffered purpose, which is
about the overall fit between the statistical evidence flowing from data at hand
and the purpose for which a party intends to use it. That distinguishes
credibility for the proffered purpose from strength of evidence and technical
implementation. Those features can be thought of as characteristics that are
135 For an example and brief discussion of evidence law considerations, see D.H. Kaye, The
Dynamics of Daubert: Methodology, Conclusions, and Fit in Statistical and Econometric Studies, 87 VA. L.
REV. 1933, 1991 (2001).
136 For example, it is well known that using ordinary least squares to estimate regression
coefficients yields biased estimates when the dependent variable is the change in some variable,
𝑦𝑦& , over time, when 𝑦𝑦& is serially correlated, and when the set of independent variables included
in the estimation includes 𝑦𝑦&'$ . For more on bias, see Kaye & Freedman, supra note 9, at 249 and
references therein.
137 This practice is variously known as specification searching, data snooping, and data mining
(though the last term has recently acquired a neutral or even positive connotation in many fields).
Halbert White, A Reality Check for Data Snooping, 68 ECONOMETRICA 1097, 1097-98 (2000); see also
E.E.O.C. v. Datapoint Corp., 570 F.2d 1264, 1270 (5th Cir. 1978) (determining that an EEOC
statistician had engaged in such conduct).
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internal to a particular study, because they directly involve calculations using
the data at hand. Credibility for the proffered purpose cannot.
To illustrate credibility for the proffered purpose, take an infamous
example from outside the law: the prediction of the Literary Digest that
Republican Alf Landon would defeat President Franklin D. Roosevelt in the
1936 election by a popular vote margin of 3 to 2.138 The Literary Digest
prediction was made from a large sample of mail-poll respondents.139 From
an internal point of view, the direction, magnitude, and strength of this
statistical evidence were all very impressive. Yet Roosevelt went on to win
with 62% of the popular vote, carrying 46 of the then-48 states.
What went wrong is that the survey’s respondents were highly selfselected: As statistics professor Maurice Bryson would point out 40 years
later, “the minority of anti-Roosevelt voters felt more strongly about the
election than did the pro-Roosevelt majority.”140
Because the survey had a huge sample size—2.3 million141—it yielded an
estimate so precise that no one could seriously view the discrepancy between
the poll and the election’s outcome as driven by random variation in the
particular sample chosen. The strength of evidence was enormous, but the
evidence powerfully answered the wrong question.142
The problem, Bryson’s explanation indicates, was that the population the
respondents represented did not represent the electorate. No statistician who
was aware of this non-representativeness before the election would have
considered the poll credible for the purpose of predicting who would win the
election, or by what margin.
In Daubert terms, the Literary Digest poll did not “fit” the question at hand
because it was ill-suited to uncover information about the population of
interest. In Joiner terms, there’s an “analytical gap” between the population
about which we could reasonably expect to learn from this poll, and the
population whose characteristics were actually at issue. And in Kumho Tire
terms, use of the Literary Digest poll is outside the ken of what an informed
statistical expert would rely on for her out-of-court work. Accordingly, in a
hypothetical case about the 1936 election, a district court should keep the
gates shut to testimony based on that poll’s results.
138 Maurice C. Bryson, The Literary Digest Poll: Making of a Statistical Myth, 30 AM.
STATISTICIAN 184, 184 (1976).
139 Id. at 185.
140 Id. This account of the doomed poll also includes an interesting rebuttal of the usual
explanation for the Literary Digest poll’s face-plant—that the problem had to do with systematic
over-representation of Republicans among those with telephones. See id. at 184-185.
141 Id. at 185.
142 Nor, to my knowledge, is there any reason to think the survey suffered from any technical
implementation problem.
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Thus the Literary Digest poll well illustrates the issue of credibility for the
proffered purpose, and its link to evidence-law reliability. Statistical evidence
is credible for the proffered purpose if the object it accurately measures is the
object the evidence is supposed to illuminate. When there are good reasons
to doubt that the object the study actually estimated was the object of interest,
an estimate can point in the direction of a party’s position, have a substantial
magnitude, and be highly statistically significant (or have a high likelihood
ratio)—and still not be credible for the proffered purpose.
By its very nature, credibility for the proffered purpose cannot easily be
assessed using the data at hand. An epidemiological study relating, say,
smoking and lung cancer is credible for the purpose of establishing that
smoking causes lung cancer only if one is willing to rule out—say—the
possibility that those who ultimately will be diagnosed with lung cancer are
just more likely to have taken up smoking.143 That would be an example of
omitted variables bias, also sometimes known as confounding. Another
alternative explanation might be that lung cancer causes people to smoke,144
or—more plausibly—that the same third variable that causes people to smoke
also causes lung cancer. How does one rule out such alternative explanations?
In the case of smoking and lung cancer, the answer was a combination of
publicly released epidemiological and lab research, as well as smoking-gun
research results the tobacco companies hid from the public for years, which
materialized only as a result of litigation.145
Perhaps the leading methodological framework for assessing causation—
and thus credibility for the proffered purpose of proving causation—in toxic
torts litigation is now the Bradford Hills criteria.146 Except for the magnitude
of the effect—according to which smaller effects are more likely to be the
result of chance variations than true causation—these criteria tend to involve
the assessment of results from multiple statistical analyses. Thus, they cannot
answer the question of whether testimony as to any single piece of statistical

143 R. A. Fisher, arguably the most influential statistical theorist of the twentieth century,
embarrassed himself by making a genetics-based variant of just this argument. For a discussion, see
Paul D. Stolley, When Genius Errs: R. A. Fisher and the Lung Cancer Controversy, 133 AM. J.
EPIDEMIOLOGY 416, 419-422 (1991).
144 Fisher made this weird argument, too. See Ronald Fisher, Cigarettes, Cancer, and Statistics, 2
CENTENNIAL REV. ARTS & SCI. 151, 162 (1958) (“Is it possible, then, that lung cancer—that is to
say, the pre-cancerous condition which must exist and is known to exist for years in those who are
going to show overt lung cancer—is one of the causes of smoking cigarettes? I don’t think it can be
excluded.”); see also Stolley, supra note 143, at 419 (noting the possibility of this causal relationship).
145 See Michael V. Ciresi, Roberta B. Walburn, & Tara D. Sutton, Decades of Deceit: Document
Discovery in the Minnesota Tobacco Litigation, 25 WILLIAM MITCHELL L. REV. 477, 558 (1999).
146 Sir Austin Bradford Hill, The Environment and Disease: Association or Causation?, 58 J.
ROYAL SOC’Y MED. 295 (1965).
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evidence should be admissible into evidence or legally sufficient, which is my
primary focus in this Article.
Sometimes, results from randomized controlled trials [RCTs] will be
available. In these settings, credibility for the proffered purpose might seem
to follow directly from the fact of randomization, provided the sample is large
and the study is well executed. Indeed, it is widely accepted that RCTs
provide causal evidence. But even this is too facile, because in the strictest
sense, the causal evidence RCTs provide is limited to the population
represented by the collection of people studied at the time they were
studied.147 To believe RCT evidence is applicable still requires one to believe
that the study’s population, dosage, and other characteristics are not too
different from the corresponding facts of the litigation at hand.
Whole careers have been spent discussing these and related questions, and
for the sake of manageability I shall not go further here. The take-home point
is that in litigation as in life generally, an analytical leap over at least some
gap is virtually always required to believe that estimation evidence can
credibly answer a specific question of interest.148
3. Analogy to Non-Statistical Evidence
The strength and credibility characteristics just described have analogues
in non-statistical evidence. Suppose Paula sues Dave for fraud. At trial, Paula
plays an audio recording of Dave, who stipulates to the authenticity of the
recording.149 On the recording, Dave says, “Let’s make sure we don’t mislead
Paula in this transaction.” Paula argues to the jury that Dave’s tone of voice
on the recording is dripping with conspiratorial sarcasm. At closing, Dave’s
attorney testifies that a reasonable person could listen to the recording and
conclude that Dave was speaking sincerely. The jury finds for Dave, and in a
147 An asthma remedy proven to help in a climate with few airborne particulates would
presumably do little good for an asthmatic caught in a building enveloped by a smoke-spewing
inferno. More generally, randomization cannot solve every interesting inferential problem. See, e.g.,
James J. Heckman & Jeffrey A. Smith, Assessing the Case for Social Experiments, 9 J. ECON. PERSP. 85,
99 (1995) (describing randomization bias, which “occurs when random assignment causes the type of
persons participating in a program to differ from the type that would participate in the program as it
normally operates”); Nancy Cartwright, Are RCTs the Gold Standard? 2 BIOSOCIETIES 11, 11 (2007)
(noting that randomization may not be the best to ensure reliability in studies); Angus Deaton,
Instruments, Randomization, and Learning about Development, 48 J. ECON. LITERATURE 424, 426 (2010)
(noting that “[r]andomized controlled trials cannot automatically trump other evidence . . .”).
148 People get less carried away about such gaps than do scholars. As a former economicsdepartment colleague of mine opined wryly, few people wonder whether those likely to die within
a period of seconds of study are prospectively more likely to be shot in the chest. Similarly, I do not
doubt that I should wait to cross a busy street, even though I’ve never seen a compellingly executed
RCT of whether it hurts to be run over by cars. These examples show the value of practical reasoning
starting from reasonable assumptions.
149 Such a recording is not hearsay when offered against a party. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(A).
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post-verdict interview, jurors report that they found the recording equally
consistent with sincerity and sarcasm. So although the recording was highly
reliable—highly credible—evidence as to its subject matter, the jury did not
see it as being highly probative—strong—evidence in favor of Paula’s position.
Now twist the hypo two ways. First, suppose any listener would hear the
voice on the recording as dripping with sarcasm. Second, instead of
stipulating to the recording’s authenticity, Dave claims he never made the
statement in question—he testifies that the recording was fabricated. The
recording is strong evidence for its subject matter: if it is taken at face value,
reasonable jurors could find for Paula (for just this reason its improper
admission over Dave’s objection would be reversible error). The question for
a juror considering whether to rely on the recording is whether it is
sufficiently credible to do so.150
These two examples underscore the distinction between credibility for the
proffered purpose, which links to evidentiary reliability, and strength of
evidence, which links to probativeness. Just as evidence law can regard nonstatistical evidence as highly reliable but not very probative in supporting the
party who offered it, so can the law regard statistical evidence as highly
credible but weak. The reverse is true as well: just as evidence law can view
non-statistical evidence as relatively unreliable but highly probative if
believed, so can evidence law treat statistical evidence as having low
credibility but quite powerful given that it is taken at face value.
C. The Proper Application of Rule 702 to Estimation Evidence Is
Friendly to the Fundamental Default Rule151
Having drawn the distinction between strength and credibility of
evidence, we are in position to discuss the appropriate role of judicial
gatekeeping under Rule 702. My central contention is that appropriate
gatekeeping is largely unrelated to the strength of estimation evidence.
Instead, gatekeeping should be focused primarily on ensuring that the
statistical evidence used was generated in a technically competent way and
has reasonable credibility for the proffered purpose.

150 The admissibility determination here typically would be based on FED. R. EVID. 901 (“To
satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying an item of evidence, the proponent must
produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is.”).
This involves a Rule 104 question, and as usual, the jury would be within its rights to view admitted
evidence as non-credible.
151 This Section includes some text drawn verbatim from an amicus brief I recently authored,
Brief for Amicus Curiae Jonah B. Gelbach in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants 7-11, In re Lipitor
(Atorvastatin Calcium) Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. II) MDL 2502, 892 F.3d
624 (4th Cir. 2018), 2017 WL 1628475 (C.A.4).
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Rule 702 gatekeeping is supposed to be about reliability, understood as
involving the “fit” between expert testimony and the question to which that
testimony speaks. Suppose an expert proposes to faithfully describe
estimation evidence from a study that was credibly designed and competently
implemented, and which only weakly supports the plaintiff ’s litigation
position. Such testimony is reliable for establishing the proposition that the
statistical facts weakly support the plaintiff ’s position.
In the rest of this Section, I first argue that Rule 702 and associated case
law do not support the exclusion of expert testimony about estimation
evidence merely because the estimation evidence fails to satisfy conventional
hypothesis testing at conventional significance levels. As my discussion above
suggests, the problem with such exclusion is that significance level is best
understood as a measure of strength, or probativeness, rather than of
reliability in the evidence law sense. I then discuss the ways in which federal
evidence law appropriately does limit the admissibility of expert testimony
about estimation evidence. Proper limitations are anchored in unreliability
rather than weakness; failure of technical implementation and lack of
credibility for the proffered purpose both provide bases for exclusion. By
contrast, questions related to the strength of evidence—e.g., the weight
accorded to it—are left to the jury in our system.
1. Rule 702 and the Daubert Trilogy Do Not Allow Gatekeeping
Based on Conventional Hypothesis Testing at
Conventional Significance Levels
Rule 702(a) requires that expert testimony about estimation evidence
“help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue.”152 Consider the Lipitor case again. Dr. Singh wrote in his expert report
that the ASCOT-LLA estimation evidence was not statistically significant at
conventional significance levels.153 He also wrote that “the direction of effect
was consistent with an increased risk of diabetes,”154 and he stated that based
on analysis of the ASCOT-LLA data as well as other information he used in
applying the Bradford Hills criteria, he found “beyond a reasonable degree
of certainty that [Lipitor] 10 mg increases the risk of diabetes.”155 The district
FED. R. EVID. 702(a).
Dr. Singh Supplemental Report at 3.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Id. at 32. I do not take a position on whether the additional information Dr. Singh
considered was consistent with Rule 702; my position is that the ASCOT-LLA evidence alone
should have been enough. I note that Dr. Singh did write that the ASCOT-LLA trial is “unreliable
in establishing” the relationship between Lipitor at 10 mg and type 2 diabetes, id. at 3-4, but it is
clear from context that he is arguing that this supposed unreliability will “bias . . . findings toward
the null” hypothesis of no effect. Id. at 3.
152
153
154
155
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court’s exclusion of Dr. Singh’s testimony was partly based on its view that he
had misapplied the Bradford Hills criteria, and for purposes of this Article, I
take no position on that issue.
But imagine if Dr. Singh had testified in his deposition simply that the
ASCOT-LLA evidence was more consistent with causation of type 2 diabetes
than with its absence. A reasonable person who understands Bayesian
hypothesis testing could believe this based on the ASCOT-LLA estimation
evidence.156 That testimony surely could have been helpful to the jury.
Rule 702(b) requires that an expert’s testimony be “based on sufficient
facts or data.” This has been understood to mean that the expert testimony
must not cherry pick, or disregard inconvenient facts or data without good
reason.157 In addition to contravening Rule 702(b), ignoring studies that reach
conclusions unhelpful to an expert’s proponent might also diminish the
credibility for the proffered purpose of the estimation evidence, raising direct
questions about the reliability of the expert’s testimony or the estimation
evidence underlying it. In Part I, I implicitly assumed that only one study is
available concerning the question at issue. Roughly speaking, that was the
situation for the case of Lipitor at the 10mg dose.158 In other cases, there will
be multiple sources of statistical estimation evidence—for example, multiple
RCTs or other studies evaluating the effect of interest. My argument from
Part I can be adapted to account for those cases; see the Appendix to this
Article for details.
I turn now to the parts of Rule 702 that directly require reliability. Rule
702(c) requires that expert testimony be the “product of reliable principles
and methods,” and Rule 702(d) further requires that “the expert has reliably
applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.”159 Bayesian
hypothesis testing involves fundamental principles of mathematical statistics
that certainly qualify as reliable principles and methods. Thus expert
testimony is reliable if it involves the correct use of Bayesian hypothesis
testing to draw inferences from estimation evidence that emerges from a
credibly designed and competently executed study.
For the reasons just given, expert testimony as to statistical results satisfies
the text of Rule 702 provided that (i) the expert correctly applies Bayesian
hypothesis testing methods to draw conclusions from underlying estimation
See Section I.D.
See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 109.
ASCOT-LLA was the only study that directly measured type 2 diabetes incidence based
on a 10mg dose. Dr. Singh Supp. Rep. at 3-4. Although Dr. Singh argued that there were other
reasons to think this dose would cause type 2 diabetes onset, these reasons involved reasoning
based on “indirect and mechanistic evidence” rather than direct estimates of the effect of a 10mg
dose. Id. at 32.
159 FED. R. EVID. 702(c) & (d).
156
157
158
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evidence that was generated from a study that is both (ii) credible for the
purpose proffered and (iii) is implemented in a technically appropriate way.
Rule 702’s current text is the result of a major amendment in 2000,
following the Daubert trilogy.160 Although the Rule itself is what controls,
courts regularly look to the trilogy cases for elaboration, so it is important to
engage these cases. I do so now.
a. Daubert
Daubert instructs that reliability means scientific validity, understood to
mean that the expert evidence at issue “support[s] what it purports to
show.”161 Applying Bayes’s Theorem to statistical evidence meets this
requirement because Bayes’s Theorem is true as a matter of mathematical
logic.162 Accordingly, use of the theorem’s implications supports any
proposition within the scope of the theorem’s subject matter.163
Using Bayes’s Theorem also satisfies the several factors identified by the
Daubert Court as indicia of reliability.164 Daubert explains that a “pertinent
consideration is whether the theory . . . has been subjected to peer review and
publication.”165 Bayes’s Theorem is among the most venerable results in
statistics.166 A special case of the theorem was published, posthumously under
Bayes’s name, in 1763.167 The role of the likelihood ratio in updating from
prior odds to posterior odds is both mathematically apparent and the subject
of countless published discussions.168
Daubert also states that “the court ordinarily should consider the known
or potential rate of error” of a scientific approach that is the subject of expert
testimony or evidence.169 As explained above, the likelihood ratio’s role in
updating prior beliefs is a matter of mathematical logic, not estimation or

160 See FED. R. EVID. 702 committee notes to 2000 amendment (“Rule 702 has been amended
in response to Daubert . . . and to the many cases applying Daubert . . .”).
161 This language comes from Brief for Amicus Curiae Jonah B. Gelbach in Support of
Plaintiffs-Appellants, supra note 151, at *19 (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590 n.9).
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 Id. (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593).
166 Id.
167 Id. (citing Thomas Bayes, An Essay Towards Solving a Problem in the Doctrine of Chances, 53
PHIL. TRANS. 370 (1763)). Interestingly, there is some doubt as to whether Bayes was the first to
state the result. See Stephen M. Stigler, Who Discovered Bayes’s Theorem?, 37 AM. STATISTICIAN 290,
290 (1983) (discussing theories of the origin of Bayes’s theorem).
168 Id.; see, e.g., JAMES O. BERGER, STATISTICAL DECISION THEORY AND BAYESIAN
ANALYSIS (1985).
169 Brief for Amicus Curiae Jonah B. Gelbach in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants, supra note
151, at *20 (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594).
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measurement, so its use cannot itself cause error.170 An empirical test of a
mathematically provable proposition can yield a result falsifying the
proposition only if the empirical test itself is faulty.171 So Bayes-based expert
testimony that evidence is more consistent with causation than with its
absence satisfies Daubert with respect to “whether [the scientific approach at
issue] can be (and has been) tested.”172
Finally, there can be no question that Bayes’s Theorem and the likelihood
ratio are “general[ly] accept[ed]” tools for a scientific community under
Daubert.173 Bayesian statistics is a theoretical field of its own, as well as the
foundation for much reasoning and estimation in many cognate applied fields,
such as psychology, economics, medicine, and so on.174 At a minimum, the
substantial community of self-identified Bayesians working in applied
fields—including psychologists, biostatisticians, econometricians, and
decision theorists—subscribe to all the principles described above.175 No
member of the wider statistical community—including frequentists—denies

Id.
Id.
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593. None of this is inconsistent with the fact that empirical evidence
indicates there’s lots of non-Bayesian behavior in the world. See, e.g., Nancy Pennington & Reid
Hastie, Explaining the Evidence: Tests of the Story Model for Juror Decision Making, 62 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 189 (1992) (discussing the prevalence of causal reasoning in decision making
processes and suggesting that jurors in a criminal trial follow the “Story Model” for their decisionmaking processes). That shows only that particular people do not update according to Bayes’s
Theorem—not that the theorem is an unreliable way to update beliefs. An important class of
violations of the theorem involve what is often referred to as the “base-rate fallacy,” and methods to
avoid it are often referred to by psychologists as “de-biasing.” See, e.g., Baruch Fischhoff, Judgment
and Decision Making, 1 WIRES COGNITIVE SCI. 724, 727 (2010) (explaining how the “‘base rate
fallacy’ . . . involves allowing even weak information about specific cases to outweigh knowledge of
what generally happens (the base rate)”); Baruch Fischhoff, Debiasing, in JUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 431-44 (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky
eds., 1982) (describing efforts to ameliorate hindsight and overconfidence biases in studies).
173 This language comes from Brief for Amicus Curiae Jonah B. Gelbach in Support of
Plaintiffs-Appellants, supra note 151, at *20 (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594).
174 See, e.g., BERGER, supra note 168; ANDREW GELMAN ET AL., BAYESIAN DATA ANALYSIS
(3d ed. 2013); GARY KOOP, BAYESIAN ECONOMETRICS (2003); EMMANUEL LESAFFRE &
ANDREW B. LAWSON, BAYESIAN BIOSTATISTICS (2012); LEONARD J. SAVAGE, THE
FOUNDATIONS OF STATISTICS (1954); Ward Edwards, Harold Lindman & Leonard J. Savage,
Bayesian Statistical Inference for Psychological Research, 70 PSYCH. REV. 193 (1963); U.S. FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FDA STAFF: GUIDANCE FOR THE USE OF
BAYESIAN STATISTICS IN MEDICAL DEVICE CLINICAL TRIALS (February 5, 2010),
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/GuidanceDocum
ents/ucm071121.pdf [https://perma.cc/PLP2-CWJT].
175 This language comes from Brief for Amicus Curiae Jonah B. Gelbach in Support of
Plaintiffs-Appellants, supra note 151, at *20.
170
171
172
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the mathematical truth of Bayes’s Theorem and the likelihood ratio’s role in
updating probabilities, given their initial values.176
In sum, because the probability of a fact relative to its negation is made
mathematically more probable when the likelihood ratio in favor of that fact
exceeds 1, to say that “the trial judge must ensure that any and all scientific
testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable,” requires
only that the statistical evidence be competently generated and credibly
related to the fact it is offered to establish.177
One way to make sense of all this is to observe that evidence law principles
apply to statistical significance as much as they apply to witness testimony in
general.178 Just as lay testimony may be both reliable and weak—as in the first
hypo involving the recording of Dave’s voice179—statistical evidence may be
more consistent with the plaintiff ’s litigation position than the defendant’s
and also have a p-value higher than what scholars would consider sufficient to
announce a scientifically notable finding.
Properly understood, then, statistical significance goes not to
admissibility but to weight.180 The Daubert Court explicitly considered that
distinction when it suggested that the respondent’s argument for excluding
expert testimony in that case
seems to us to be overly pessimistic about the capabilities of the jury and of
the adversary system generally. Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of
contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the
traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible
evidence . . . Additionally, in the event the trial court concludes that the
scintilla of evidence presented supporting a position is insufficient to allow a
reasonable juror to conclude that the position more likely than not is true,
the court remains free to direct a judgment . . . and likewise to grant summary
judgment. . . . These conventional devices, rather than wholesale exclusion
176 Id.; see, e.g., ANDREW GELMAN ET AL., supra note 174, at 3 (promoting the use of Bayes’s
theorem in statistical analysis, noting that “[t]he essential characteristics of Bayesian methods is
their explicit use of probability for quantifying uncertainty in inferences based on statistical data
analysis.”); see also BERGER, supra note 168 (addressing both Bayesian and non-Bayesian decision
theory). There are major methodological disagreements as to the appropriateness of Bayesian
estimation among those who use statistical methods in professional work. But non-Bayesians do not
question the mathematical correctness of any of the claims made supra. Rather, they question the
appropriateness of Bayesian estimation techniques because these require specification of particular
prior beliefs. The arguments used supra make use of objective legal standards to solve this
subjectivity problem (except where useful in demonstrative examples).
177 This language comes from Brief for Amicus Curiae Jonah B. Gelbach in Support of
Plaintiffs-Appellants, supra note 151, at *20 (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589).
178 Id. at *22.
179 Id.; see subsection II.B.3, supra.
180 That is, statistical significance is like any other type of evidence, such as witness credibility,
whose importance should be left up to the fact finder to decide.
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. . ., are the appropriate safeguards where the basis of scientific testimony
meets the standards of Rule 702.181

Daubert’s reference to “shaky but admissible evidence” obliterates the
basis for requiring statistical evidence to meet significance levels
conventionally required by scholars in their scholarly capacities. By design,
significance levels used in scholarship are not “shaky.”182 They are meant to
be powerful and convincing.183 Otherwise, the standards in use would not
have been adopted to establish that statistical evidence is sufficient to
constitute knowledge.184 If such significance levels could be required by trial
courts for statistical evidence to be admissible, “shaky” statistical evidence
could not be admitted at all, contravening the above passage in Daubert.185
Even more tellingly, it would render pointless the adversarial devices and
procedural mechanisms, such as summary judgment, that Daubert emphasized.186
b. Joiner
Joiner is most connected to my analysis because of its insistence that
conclusions and methodology are not entirely distinct, such that too great an
“analytical gap” between the two will doom an expert’s testimony.187

181 This language comes from Brief for Amicus Curiae Jonah B. Gelbach in Support of
Plaintiffs-Appellants, supra note 151, at *20 (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596 (citations omitted)).
182 Id. at *23.
183 Id.
184 That is not to say that everyone regards, say, the conventional 5% significance level as
powerful and convincing. For example, Berger, supra note 168, at 151-152, provides calculations
showing that support for the null hypothesis in conventional hypothesis testing is often much
stronger than a naïve guess based on the p-value would indicate. And a recently released paper coauthored by seventy-two prominent applied and theoretical statisticians argues that the threshold pvalue of 0.05 is too liberal for use in scientific contexts, because it leads to too many “discoveries” of
non-existent relationships. Daniel J. Benjamin et al., Redefine Statistical Significance, 2 NATURE
HUM. BEHAV. 6, 6-10 (2018). The authors “emphasize that this proposal is about standards of
[scientific] evidence, not standards for policy action,” which could as well be applied to litigation.
Id. at 8. See also Sander Greenland et al., Statistical Tests, P Values, Confidence Intervals, and Power: A
Guide to Misinterpretations, 31 EUR. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 337, 340 (2016) (describing the prominent
misconceptions of p values); Ronald L. Wasserstein & Nicole A. Lazar, The ASA’s Statement on pValues: Context, Process, and Purpose, 70 AM. STATISTICIAN 129, 129 (2016) (discussing the challenges
surrounding the American Statistical Association’s decision to “develop[] a policy statement on pvalues and statistical significance . . . . ”); see, e.g., STEPHEN T. ZILIAK & DEIRDRE N.
MCCLOSKEY, THE CULT OF STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE: HOW THE STANDARD ERROR COSTS
US JOBS, JUSTICE, AND LIVES 2 (2008) (criticizing conventional hypothesis testing).
185 This language comes from Brief for Amicus Curiae Jonah B. Gelbach in Support of
Plaintiffs-Appellants, supra note 151, at *23.
186 Id.
187 Interestingly, the sole question presented in the petition for certiorari in Joiner was: “What
is the standard of appellate review for trial court decisions excluding expert testimony under Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993)?” Petition for Writ of Certiorari at (i),
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This renunciation of Daubert’s assertion that the “focus, of course, must
be solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they
generate” might seem to reopen the question of whether strength of evidence
is the most that the degree of statistical significance can usefully measure.188
In the most widely cited part of his opinion for the Joiner Court, Chief Justice
Rehnquist wrote:
[C]onclusions and methodology are not entirely distinct from one another.
Trained experts commonly extrapolate from existing data. But nothing in
either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district court to
admit opinion evidence that is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit
of the expert. A court may conclude that there is simply too great an
analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered.189

There is much truth to this statement. Statistical evidence is often
founded either on events that have already occurred outside the immediate
context of the case at bar, or on some sample of the events that form that
context. The same is usually true outside the litigation context, actually. It
would be mock-worthy to question the probative value of the results of a
flawlessly designed and executed double-blind RCT of a drug’s efficacy. At
least, it would if the skepticism were directed at the experimental population
actually included in the study at the time it was conducted. But if the question
in litigation involves substantially different people, substantially different
circumstances, or both, then one needn’t be a gadfly to question the
applicability of the study’s results.190
And all of that is true of the very highest-quality studies—those that are
highly credible for the purpose for which they were designed. Studies that do
not use randomized assignment—or involve animals rather than humans, or
humans exposed to different substances than the ones at issue in litigation,
and so on—require a further leap of analytical faith to be treated as credible.
Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (No. 96-188), 1996 WL 33414071. This question has no direct link to the
appropriate standard for statistical evidence in litigation.
188 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595.
189 Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146.
190 See Merck & Co., Inc., v. Garza, 347 S.W.3d 256, 262-66 (Tex. 2011) (finding that wellexecuted studies suggesting an increase of injury must be considered alongside other factors
excluding other possible causes of the injury for there to be sufficient evidence to find for the
plaintiff); Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 724-30 (Tex. 1997) (holding that
three different studies on the cardiovascular effects of the drug in question or a similar drug did not
show statistically significant doubling of risk for someone like the plaintiff); Jonah B. Gelbach, The
Triangle of Law and the Role of Evidence in Class Action Litigation, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1807, 1819 (2017)
(arguing that in Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036 (2016), “[t]he operative question for
the plaintiffs’ evidence [wa]s . . . whether [measured data] could be assumed to be sufficiently similar
so that it would be reasonable to use an overall measure—such as an average—in place of . . .
unknowable actual” data).
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This is as true for an expert assembling an opinion from such studies as it
is for a layperson. Where expertise runs out, and runs into generalized
inference, it is appropriate for a judge to exercise reasoned discretion in
applying her own personal intuitions. When the question is whether to allow
inferences from a particular chunk of statistical evidence gathered from a
different population or under different circumstances, it is no answer for a
party to merely point to the label “expert.” Ex hypothesi, the expert’s expertise
concerns something other than the reasonableness of actually using the
evidence in question. So when an expert’s conclusions are linked to the
statistical evidence at issue only by the expert’s “ipse dixit,” the trial court owes
the expert no deference as to whether to draw or reject that link.
Two of the studies relied upon by plaintiffs’ experts in Joiner—referred to
by Chief Justice Rehnquist as the third and fourth studies at issue—fit this
picture well. The third study involved an examination of the effects of mineral
oil, rather than the PCB chemicals that were the alleged cause of Mr. Joiner’s
lung cancer; Chief Justice Rehnquist pointed out that this study “made no
mention of PCB” chemicals.191 The fourth study involved people who had
been exposed to PCB chemicals, but also to “numerous [other] potential
carcinogens.”192 The trial court could reasonably determine that these studies
weren’t relevant to the Joiners’ case, because too great a leap of faith would
be required to believe them relevant—in Joiner’s terms, because the analytical
gap between the statistical evidence and the case at bar was too wide.
The first two studies at issue in Joiner appear to have been quite different
from the third and fourth. As Chief Justice Rehnquist describes the first two,
each involved workers who had been exposed to PCB chemicals. Both of these
studies found that deaths from lung cancer in the studied populations
exceeded what would normally be expected. Joiner held that the district court
was within its discretion to rule that these studies provided an insufficient
basis for the expert’s opinion. As to the first study, that was because the
study’s authors “were unwilling to say that PCB exposure had caused cancer
among the workers they examined.”193 As to the second, it was because the
extent of the elevated incidence of lung cancer deaths “was not statistically

191 Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146. Mr. Joiner alleged that his exposure to PCB chemicals occurred via
contamination of the mineral oil-based coolant he used in his work as an electrician; thus, it was the
carcinogenic effect of contaminating chemicals, and not anything about mineral oil per se, that was
at issue. Id. at 139.
192 Id. at 146.
193 Id. at 145. The district court explicitly mentioned statistical significance in quoting from this
study. See Joiner v. Gen. Elec. Co., 864 F. Supp. 1310, 1324 (1994) (“The numbers were small, the value
of the risk estimate was not statistically significant, and such risk had never been suggested before.”).
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significant and the authors of the study did not suggest a link between the
increase in lung cancer deaths and the exposure to PCB’s”.194
To see the problem with the Joiner opinion as to these studies, just ask:
Would these two studies have provided an adequate basis for an expert to find
causation if the results had been statistically significant? If so, then there
couldn’t have been anything unreliable about the studies in Daubert’s sense,
so there would be no meaningful analytical gap in relying on them in forming
an opinion as to causation. As to the two PCB studies in Joiner, neither the
Supreme Court nor the trial court raised an issue that can fairly be regarded
as an analytical gap.
But here’s one: arguably it is unreasonable for an expert to simply assume
that it is possible to understand the cause of cancer for the plaintiff in Joiner
from the first two studies at issue. Mr. Joiner was an electrician who would
“occasionally” have PCB chemicals “splash . . . into his eyes and mouth.”195
The two studies in question involved (i) data on workers in an electrical
capacitor plant, who for years worked with substantial quantities of PCB
chemicals196 (the first study) and (ii) data on workers in a plant that actually
produced PCB chemicals (the second one).197 The differences between the
types, frequency, and duration of exposure suggest the possibility that these
studies might have been quite unreliable as a basis for concluding that Mr.
Joiner’s lung cancer was caused by PCB exposure.198
Statistical significance at more demanding significance levels is helpful,
where it is, because it indicates that the evidence is stronger—i.e., more
probative. But if there is no “analytical” gap in using evidence E when it
strongly points in the direction of the expert’s conclusion, how can there be
an “analytical” gap in using the same E when it points in exactly the same
direction, just less probatively?
A final point about the language in Joiner and statistical significance is that
it is under-specified. It is vacuous to say only that a result “is statistically
insignificant.” Statistical significance is necessarily defined by reference to a
significance level. That is crucial because by the very nature of statistical
significance, every estimate is statistically significant at some significance level.
Suppose the authors of the first study in Joiner, the one involving the workers
Joiner, 522 U.S. at 145.
Id. at 139.
Pier Alberto Bertazzi et al., Cancer Mortality of Capacitor Manufacturing Workers, 11 AM. J.
INDUS. MED. 165, 167 (1987) (stating that peak annual PCB consumption in the plant was 250 tons).
197 See Joiner, 522 U.S. at 145 (citing “J. Zack & D. Musch, Mortality of PCB Workers at the
Monsanto Plant in Sauget, Illinois (Dec. 14, 1979) (unpublished report), 3 Record, Doc. No. 11.”).
198 For a wide-ranging discussion of Joiner from the perspective of philosophy of science, see
Susan Haack, An Epistemologist in the Bramble-Bush: At the Supreme Court with Mr. Joiner, 26 J.
HEALTH POL., POL’Y, & L. 217 (2001).
194
195
196
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in the capacitor plant, had declared: “our results are statistically significant at
the 49.99% level.” That statement would have been true given the study’s
findings, actually, because the number of lung cancer deaths observed among
those exposed to PCB chemicals exceeded the number that were expected.
Thus, the inadmissibility of expert testimony founded on this study in
Joiner cannot be traced to some mythic, wholesale absence of statistical
significance. It must instead be because the results were not statistically
significant at a suffi ciently demanding significance level. So as a matter of
definition, there is no way around the conclusion that Joiner’s language as to
the two PCB studies amounts to rejecting them because they yielded
insufficiently strong evidence.
But one can hardly conclude that Joiner licenses district courts to require
whatever strength of evidence they like while marching under the banner of
Rule 702 reliability. That would be a judicial hiding of elephants in
mouseholes199: surely if the Court were selecting a particular level of
statistical significance for use in litigation, it would have done so with more
than an offhand mention or two. For another, it’s doubtful that when he wrote
Joiner, Chief Justice Rehnquist had a particularly clear grasp of what statistical
significance does and doesn’t mean.200
One would have to pole vault over an analytical chasm to conclude that
Joiner’s inexact language about statistical significance somehow announces a
general common law policy in favor of—what? A 5 percent significance level?
10 percent? 1 percent? This indeterminacy is a clue that the Joiner Court had
little awareness of the significant can of worms it popped open. And other
Supreme Court cases that take a positive view of scholarly levels of statistical
significance do so at most tentatively.201 In its most recent consideration of
the issue in Matrixx Initiatives v. Siracusano,202 the Court resoundingly and

199 Cf. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001) (Scalia, J.) (“Congress, we
have held, does not alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary
provisions—it does not, one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes.”).
200 On this front, see Chief Justice Rehnquist’s partial dissent from Daubert. It self-consciously
evinces a lack of understanding of the concept of scientific falsifiability of hypotheses, which is
closely related to the logic of null hypothesis significance testing. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 600
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting in part) (“I defer to no one in my confidence in federal judges; but I am
at a loss to know what is meant when it is said that the scientific status of a theory depends on its
‘falsifiability,’ and I suspect some of them will be, too.”)
201 See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 488 n.8 (1977) (pointing out discrepancies in the
statistical evidence offered by the respondent); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. U.S., 433 U.S. 299, 312-13
(1977) (remanding to the trial court to make further findings regarding the statistical evidence
presented by the government).
202 563 U.S. 27, 40-41 (2011).
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unanimously rejected the idea that it is always necessary for estimation
evidence to meet demanding significance levels to prove causation.203
In sum, although Joiner’s embrace of the district court’s reasons for
rejecting the two studies that involved PCB chemicals is inconsistent with
my argument in this Article and with Daubert, it also sits poorly with any
reasonable understanding of Joiner’s otherwise sensible language about
analytical gaps and ipse dixits. One can save both the result in Joiner and the
overall reasoning without understanding Joiner to say that a district court is
within its discretion to reject expert testimony merely because it is founded
on results that are statistically insignificant at conventional significance levels.
To put it another way, there are only three alternatives. One is to treat
Joiner as announcing a strength-of-evidence standard of proof in the most
sotto of voce. I reject this option, and so should you. The second alternative is
to treat Joiner’s language about statistical significance as dicta. And the third
is to view Joiner as consistent with admitting expert testimony about
estimation evidence so long as the expert testifies that estimation evidence is
statistically significant at some level. Both the second and third
understandings of Joiner on the statistical significance point are consistent
with the fundamental default rule. The last approach was recently taken by a
district court hearing an antitrust case in which the expert economist testified
that he had adopted the 50% significance level (he gave reasons) and that the
estimation evidence was statistically significant at that level.204
c. Kumho Tire
Kumho Tire explains that experts must “employ[] in the courtroom the
same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in

203 Id. The Court noted that “[a] lack of statistically significant data does not mean that medical
experts have no reliable basis for inferring a causal link between a drug and adverse events.” Id. at
40. In fact, the Court noted, relying on the Amici Brief for Medical Researchers, “medical experts
rely on other evidence to establish an inference of causation . . . ‘[M]edical professionals and
researchers do not limit the data they consider to the results of randomized clinical trials or to
statistically significant evidence.’” Id. at 40-41. Similarly, “[t]he FDA . . . does not limit the evidence
it considers for purposes of assessing causation and taking regulatory action to statistically
significant data.” Id. at 41.
204 See In re High-Tech Emp. Antitrust Litig., No. 11-cv-02509-LHK, 2014 WL 1351040, at *12
(N.D. Cal., Apr. 4, 2014); id. at n.25 (“Dr. Leamer may testify . . . that the fact that his alternative
conduct regression model’s conduct coefficients pass the 50% level ‘suggests that it is more likely
than not that the compensation of employees were decreased during the period of the
agreements.’”); see also In re Photochromic Lens Antitrust Litig., No. 8:10-cv-00984-T-27EA, 2014
WL 1338605, at *26 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 3, 2014) (approving the use of a significance level of .50 because
the testifying expert economist justified the approach on the basis of Type II error probabilities, and
also because the opposing expert failed to justify rejecting that approach except because it was
“simply out of bounds of what economists do”).
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the relevant field.”205 It might seem that this criterion disqualifies an expert
from using a significance level of just below 50 percent in expert testimony,
if that expert follows the common scholarly norm of using a more demanding
level such as 5 percent in her scholarly activities.206 But such a determination
would be inapt, because “employs . . . the same level of intellectual rigor”
cannot reasonably mean “requires the same level of statistical significance.”207
Intellectual rigor demands consistent reasoning and attentiveness to
contextual variation.208 It is intellectually rigorous for an expert viewing a
fixed set of facts to provide different answers to different questions. The legal
sufficiency question related to expert testimony in litigation is whether
statistical results make the fact at issue more probable than not. That is the
correct standard in expert testimony, even when the expert giving that
testimony is a scholar who uses more demanding levels of statistical
significance in her work intended for publication in scholarly journals.
Scholars operating in a scholarly capacity have the luxury of following
social norms that require powerful statistical evidence before a null
hypothesis can be rejected.209 That’s okay in scholarland, because scholars
rarely if ever have to use their statistical results to make consequential
decisions on short time.210 In fact, a common way to describe statistically
insignificant results is that they “fail to reject the null hypothesis,” not that
they prove the alternative hypothesis; the non-rejecting researcher finds
herself in an intermediate state of doubt as to which hypothesis is true. That
kind of epistemic luxury is alien to litigation. Courts owe no deference to
such social conventions merely because some—or even many—scholars follow
them.211 The level of statistical significance to be required is an instance in
which, as Daubert put it, academic considerations simply do not line up with
the judicial “project of reaching a quick, final, and binding legal judgment—
often of great consequence—about a particular set of events in the past.”212
Consider a scholar who has written, in a scholarly journal, that a study
meant to speak to injury causation by a drug was poorly conceived and
executed, such that its quantitative results cannot be taken at face value. If
this scholar comes to court and relies on that same study’s quantitative results,

526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999).
This language comes from Brief for Amicus Curiae Jonah B. Gelbach in Support of
Plaintiffs-Appellants, supra note 151, at *24.
207 Id. (citing Kumho, 562 U.S. at 152).
208 Id.
209 Id. at 25.
210 Id.
211 Id.
212 Id. at 26 (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597).
205
206
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then he is applying a different standard of intellectual rigor inside the
courtroom than in his scholarly work. He has a Kumho Tire problem.
But what if all of that were reversed? Instead, the scholar has written that
the study in question was flawlessly designed and perfectly executed. And he
has written that although the injury rate is higher among those who took the
drug than among those who didn’t, the difference isn’t statistically significant
at the 5% level. If he then testifies in court that the statistical evidence is more
consistent with injury causation than not, we should not understand Kumho
Tire to bar his testimony for lack of intellectual rigor.
We can understand the issue here as involving the proper level of
generality to ensure that experts use the same level of intellectual rigor for
their courtroom and outside work. To insist that experts always use
conventional hypothesis testing at conventional significance levels is to insist
not that they rigorously use statistical methodology both inside and outside
the courtroom, but rather that they always answer causation questions by
reference to the same evidentiary standard. Yet the standard at issue in a civil
lawsuit is different from the one scholars use when considering whether
evidence is strong enough to constitute scientific knowledge. That can’t make
sense. Rather, when it is appropriate to do so, an expert who analyzes the
same facts using the same methodology in an intellectually rigorous way
sometimes will give different answers to different questions.
2. The Proper Focus in Gatekeeping is on Technical Implementation and
Credibility for the Proper Purpose
Evidence law does properly cabin the use of statistical evidence. It
establishes rigorous standards for the expert’s use of underlying statistical
data, as well as for the collection and generation of that data. Applying these
standards might properly lead a district court to exclude expert testimony in
many settings.
Even if she followed Part I’s playbook to measure the strength of evidence,
an expert’s testimony as to statistical evidence could still be unreliable in
numerous ways. The expert might have committed mathematical errors in
calculating the likelihood ratio or statistics based on it. He might have used a
statistical model unrelated to the fact in question. He might have testified as
to statistical results reported by others that suffer from either of those
deficiencies. And, as my discussion of the PCB studies in Joiner suggested,
the underlying study that generated the data on which the expert built his
opinion might lack credibility for the proffered purpose.
To further illustrate the last point, I now consider two quite different cases
and then offer some further general comments.
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a. Credibility for the Proffered Purpose: Mayor of Philadelphia v. Educational
Equality League
Mayor of Philadelphia v. Educational Equality League213 was a racial
discrimination case brought in the early 1970s, long before Daubert, but it
illustrates well two kinds of concerns at which gatekeeping should be
directed. The plaintiff organization alleged the Mayor had violated the Equal
Protection Clause by discriminating against blacks in making appointments
to an advisory panel that nominated city School Board members.214 The panel
consisted of thirteen members in total, of whom the Mayor had discretion to
appoint four.215 Neither party introduced an expert to discuss statistics at the
trial court,216 but the Court of Appeals concluded sua sponte that the small
number of black members on the panel—either one or two out of thirteen
over three appointment cycles between 1967 and 1971—was evidence of a
statistical disparity considering that blacks made up 33.5% of the city’s
population and 60% of the public school system.217
The Supreme Court reversed.218 But it did not reject the use of statistical
evidence; indeed, the Court took pains to state that “[s]tatistical analyses have
served and will continue to serve an important role as one indirect indicator
of racial discrimination in access to service on governmental bodies . . . .”219
Nor did the reversal hinge on the sua sponte nature of the lower court’s use of
statistical reasoning. Rather, the basis for reversal as to the statistical evidence
was that “the simplistic percentage comparisons undertaken by the Court of
Appeals lack[ed] real meaning in the context of this case.”220 One reason was
that the city charter required that
nine of the 13 seats [be] restricted to the highest ranking officers of designated
categories of citywide organizations and institutions. . . . [T]his is not a case
in which it can be assumed that all citizens are fungible for purposes of
determining whether members of a particular class have been unlawfully
excluded. At least with regard to nine seats on the Panel and assuming,
arguendo, that percentage comparisons are meaningful in a case involving
discretionary appointments, the relevant universe for comparison purposes
consists of the highest ranking officers of the categories of organizations and

213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220

415 U.S. 605 (1974).
Id. at 609-10.
Id. at 607.
Id. at 620.
Educ. Equal. League v. Tate, 472 F.2d 612, 615 (1973).
Mayor of Phila., 415 U.S. at 621, 629.
Id. at 620.
Id.
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institutions specified in the city charter, not the population at large. The
Court of Appeals overlooked this distinction.221

So the Supreme Court believed that when the city charter requires nine
panelists to be drawn from a particular population, it is that population, and
not the city-wide population, that is at issue when discrimination is alleged.
The statistical evidence under consideration—even if it had been the subject
of good faith trial testimony from a competent expert—compared the
composition of the panel to the overall city population, which was the wrong
comparison group because the charter required panelists be drawn from a
particular subpopulation of the city.222
In addition, the Court also held that the district court was right to worry
about “the smallness of the sample presented by the 13-member Panel,”
holding that the “Court of Appeals erred in failing to recognize the
importance of this flaw in straight percentage comparisons.”223 The Court’s
concern about sample size did not spring from a belief that some statistic was
statistically insignificant due to small sample size. Rather, the Court seems to
have generically worried about the appropriateness of basing any conclusions
on evidence from such a small number of panelists (of whom only four could
be chosen on an entirely discretionary basis).224
Mayor of Philadelphia thus provides an early illustration of the Supreme
Court assessing statistical evidence for its fit with the question at bar, and
finding it wanting. Whatever the other evidence in the case, there was little
reason to regard the statistical evidence as offering a reliable way to explain
the underrepresentation of blacks on the city panel.
b. Credibility for the Proffered Purpose: Merck v. Garza
Now consider the Texas Supreme Court case of Merck v. Garza.225 That
was a product liability case alleging that Leonel Garza’s fatal heart attack was
caused by his use of Vioxx. The plaintiffs, relatives of Mr. Garza, sought to
introduce estimation evidence from a clinical trial showing that Vioxx caused
a large increase in the relative risk of heart attack. The issue on appeal was
Id. at 620-21 (emphasis added).
The Court noted that plaintiffs had not alleged that the charter itself was discriminatory.
Id. at 614.
223 Id. at 620-621.
224 Here it is worth noting that in Title VII cases, the EEOC Four-Fifths Rule is an alternative
metric for courts faced with statistical evidence. The Four-Fifths Rule will sometimes be satisfied
when the formal statistical significance tests fail to reach conventional levels of significance such as
5%, in which case plaintiffs will argue for the Four-Fifths Rule and defendants for a rule of statistical
significance. For a discussion of this pattern, see Jennifer L. Peresie, Toward a Coherent Test for
Disparate Impact Discrimination, 84 IND. L.J. 773, 781-84 (2009).
225 347 S.W.3d 256 (Tex. 2011).
221
222
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sufficiency rather than admissibility, but the court couched its discussion in
terms of reliability just the same. Observing that Mr. Garza had taken “a
much smaller dosage of Vioxx for much less time” than subjects in the clinical
trial,226 the court stated that the clinical trial “study suggests nothing at all
about significantly lesser exposure.”227 Thus while the “usage involved in a
study need not match the claimant’s usage exactly,” the court found that the
instant case failed the requirement that “the conditions of the study should
be substantially similar to the claimant’s circumstances,”228 and the court held
that the study was of no help to the plaintiffs.
Garza illustrates the fact that a study can be very credible for some
purposes—the study in question was a randomized controlled trial—and still
have too little credibility with respect to the question for which it is offered.229
c. Cherry Picking
Another basis for exclusion would involve cherry picking results when
there are multiple statistical studies available. Rule 702(b) requires that an
expert base her opinion on “sufficient facts or data.”230 The Committee Note
to the 2000 Amendment to Rule 702 briefly observes that “sufficient” in this
context means “quantitative” rather than “qualitative.”231 According to Wright
& Miller, the point of this language is to ensure that experts take into account
all the pertinent facts or data and not engage in cherry picking.232
Kumho Tire is also on point. An expert operating in her scholarly capacity
would not ignore the results of studies she thought were well designed, well
executed, and otherwise were credible for a particular purpose. Kumho Tire’s
requirement that experts use the same “intellectual rigor” in the courtroom
as in their scholarly activities thus requires that in forming opinions about
statistical evidence, testifying experts adequately take into account all the
reasonably applicable statistical evidence—not just whatever supports the
position of the party proffering their testimony.
Another way to express the proscription on cherry picking is to observe
that ignoring some of the credible statistical evidence when drawing
226 The clinical trial involved a dose of 50 mg, and a median duration of nine months, by
comparison to a dose half as great for Mr. Garza, for only twenty-five days. Id. at 266.
227 Id.
228 Id.
229 The legal standard in Garza was substantially based on a Bendectin case from the same
court a decade and a half earlier, Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 720 (Tex.
1997), in which the court had stressed that a plaintiff seeking to use epidemiological studies would
have to show similarity of the same type the Garza court found wanting with respect to a clinical
trial study. Garza, 347 S.W.3d at 262.
230 FED. R. EVID. 702(b).
231 FED. R. EVID. 702, committee notes to 2000 amendment.
232 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 109.
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conclusions opens up Joiner’s analytical gap. An expert who discounts some of
the evidence can close the gap by giving good reasons to do so, but one who
cannot do so has a Joiner problem.
Even in the absence of Rule 702(b), Kumho Tire, or Joiner, Rule 403 would
provide additional reason to require experts to take into account all the
evidence. Testifying on the basis of a cherry-picked set of results is an
excellent way to mislead a jury.233
d. Summary
In sum, this Section has shown that the Federal Rules of Evidence and
the Daubert trilogy have plenty of work to do with respect to statistical
evidence. That work is properly directed at issues related to technical
implementation, to the credibility of statistical evidence for the proffered
purpose, and to cherry picking. Gatekeeping of testimony about statistical
evidence on these bases is not only acceptable, it is required under the Rules.
Practical reasoning helps courts here, as do the incentives litigants have as a
result of our adversarial process. Moreover, there is extensive and excellent
qualitative guidance about credibility in the Reference Manual on Scientific
Evidence published by the Federal Judicial Center.234
III. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS RELATED TO THE FUNDAMENTAL
DEFAULT RULE
This Part discusses normative issues implicated by the fundamental default
rule introduced in Part I. Section A discusses the administrability advantages
of the fundamental default rule when the preponderance standard applies.
Section B considers the impact on both the volume of litigation, and primary
behavior, of adopting my position. Finally, Section C discusses how Bayesian
hypothesis testing can be used to conceptualize the basis for (i) the Supreme
Court’s choice of the preponderance standard and (ii) alternative standards.

233 See FED. R. EVID. 403 (“The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing
the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative
evidence.” (emphasis added)).
234 FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, RMSE, supra note 9. See, e.g., chapters on statistics (by
David H. Kaye and David A. Freedman), multiple regression (by Daniel L. Rubinfeld), and
epidemiology (by Michael D. Green, D. Michal Freedman, & Leon Gordis).
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A. The Fundamental Default Rule Would Improve
Administrability and Litigation Practice
There’s not all that much to say about administrability considerations with
my proposal, but what there is to say is good. I claim that the Rules imply a
simple standard for the admissibility and sufficiency of estimation evidence
for the questions at which they are directed: the evidence is generally
acceptable when it supports the party offering it. It is difficult to conceive of
a more easily administered rule than that (except a rule instructing judges to
either never or always allow statistical evidence). So, administrability is a
mark in favor of the default rule.
But the benefit of the rule doesn’t stop there. Experience suggests that
using conventional hypothesis testing at conventional significance levels has
had its own share of administration challenges. Some cases have devolved
into classic battlefields of the experts, with the proper significance level being
the rough equivalent of Alsace-Lorraine.235 Methodological skirmishes likely
would be less prevalent if significance levels were de-emphasized in favor of
simply looking at which side the evidence supports.
In addition, the U.S. reports have plenty of opinions in which judges have
butchered the meaning of statistical significance, wrongly equated it with
posterior probabilities, or both.236 And even courts that do get this meaning
right can’t avoid the embarrassing fact that statistical significance at
conventional significance levels does not answer the question that’s actually at
issue in the litigation.

235 See, e.g., Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 309 F.R.D. 251, 262 (N.D. Tex. 2015)
(describing district court decision resolving disagreements between experts over, e.g., technical
statistical issues related to multiple testing); In re Photochromic Lens Antitrust Litig., No. 8:10-cv00984-T-27EA, 2014 WL 1338605, at *26-27 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 3, 2014) (describing plaintiff ’s expert’s
reasons for using the 50% significance level, noting that defendant’s expert “did not controvert those
explanations” except to state that using the 50% significance level is “simply out of bounds of what
economists do,” and ultimately finding for the plaintiff ’s side on the ground that the “use of a 50%
measure of statistical significance, by itself, is” not “sufficient justification for denying class
certification”) (internal quotations omitted); In re Am. Int’l Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., 265 F.R.D. 157,
186-97 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), vacated and remanded, 689 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 2012) (stating that the
defendant’s expert “contended that 5% is the minimum level of statistical significance that
conventional statistical methodology would accept,” noting that the plaintiff ’s expert testified that
the standard is at least 10% in the financial economics field, and ultimately finding for the defendant
on the issue in question because “there is a distinction between reporting and drawing conclusions
based on a 10% level of statistical significance”); Segar v. Civiletti, 508 F. Supp. 690, 701 (D.D.C.
1981), aff ’d in part, vacated in part sub nom. Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (noting
that “[p]laintiffs’ experts consider a .10 level . . .to be statistically significant,” that “Defendants [sic]
experts stated that anything above the .05 level was statistically insignificant,” and that because the
“probative value of a study is affected by that study’s statistical significance . . . this Court accords
minimal value to Plaintiffs’ promotions analysis . . ..”).
236 See, e.g., Kaye & Freedman, supra note 9, at 252 n.103 (collecting cases).
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Thus, Daubert hearings might be considerably different, and perhaps even
less frequent, if the fundamental default rule were applied. Because scholarly
levels of statistical significance would not be required to allow an expert’s
testimony about statistical estimation evidence, it is likely that there would
be many fewer arcane arguments over statistical details, which not all judges
really understand. What arguments did occur at Daubert hearings would
presumably turn on the issues I identified in Section II.C as the proper ones
under Rule 702—namely, issues related to technical implementation and
credibility for the proffered purpose.
Understanding these issues, and coming to a reasonable view about them,
requires less specialized knowledge than does understanding the details of
hypothesis testing. Moreover, credibility for the proffered purpose is an area
where laypeople’s capacities might not be all that much less than experts’. For
example, one doesn’t need a degree in applied statistics to understand the
source and importance of the non-representativeness of the Literary Digest
survey discussed in subsection II.B.2. Thus, there’s reason to believe that
adopting the fundamental default rule would de-mystify Daubert hearings.
An additional question is how adopting the fundamental default rule
would affect the set of studies on which experts rely in litigation. Because
studies would no longer be considered uninformative merely because they
don’t meet scholarly standards of statistical significance, one might think the
set of studies available for use would expand. But under current practice, a
study that doesn’t meet scholarly significance levels is helpful to the side
wishing to argue there isn’t “an effect” (i.e., the defendant in my analysis
above, e.g., with respect to the Lipitor litigation). Switching to the
fundamental default rule just changes whom the study favors, not whether it
should be considered (assuming it is otherwise appropriate).
At trial, an expert could be allowed to testify on the condition that the
expert address the strength of statistical evidence during direct examination.
And on cross-examination, a good trial attorney will be able to skewer any
expert who overstates this strength. Attorneys could also ask testifying
experts to describe the degree of confidence they hold concerning the
conclusions they describe as reasonable. And cross-examiners could ask what
assumptions, including about prior beliefs, the expert made in coming to their
conclusions. And of course, attorneys could attack the technical
implementation or credibility for the proffered purpose of the studies
underlying experts’ testimony, and a jury is within its rights to find those
requirements unmet. So even under the fundamental default rule, there is
room for lawyers at trial to flesh out the details of statistical estimation
evidence. In fact, it would be salutary to divert lawyer effort away from
arguments about significance levels and the (ill-)fitting nature of conventional
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hypothesis testing, and toward the question of how credible and how strong
the statistical estimation evidence really is.
On the disadvantage side, adopting the default rule would increase the set
of cases in which Rule 403 appropriately comes into play. That Rule allows
judges to exclude relevant evidence if its “probative value is substantially
outweighed” by various dangers, including misleading the jury.237 Using
conventional hypothesis testing at demanding levels ensures that admitted
statistical evidence is far stronger than necessary to meet the preponderance
standard. By its nature, such evidence has quite high probative value, so Rule
403 dangers would have to be quite severe to “substantially outweigh[]” the
probative value of this evidence. Switching to my default rule would mean
that evidence with more marginal probative value would be admissible in the
absence of Rule 403. So, Rule 403’s balancing test would be satisfied more
frequently under my default rule. To the extent that a Rule 403 assessment
doesn’t merely duplicate the Rule 702 analysis judges already do, that would
temper the administrability gain from adopting the fundamental default rule,
because we would have more Rule 403 fights as opposing parties argued that
juries would be too easily persuaded by the supposed magic of statistics. But
perhaps judges should not often exclude even weak statistical estimation
evidence under Rule 403. Judge Posner writes: “fears that jurors are dazzled
by evidence which involves explicit probability estimates, and so give such
evidence more weight than a good Bayesian would do, appear to be unfounded;
jurors appear to give statistical evidence less weight that [sic] they should.”238
My sense is that judges should rarely find that Rule 403 warrants
excluding weak statistical evidence. As Daubert declares, the need to attack
“shaky but admissible evidence” is not unknown to trial practice, and it is
traditionally entrusted to opposing counsel’s “[v]igorous cross-examination”
and “presentation of contrary evidence,” as well as the judge’s “careful
instruction on the burden of proof.”239 Jurors need not understand all the ins
and outs of statistical significance testing, or the generalized likelihood ratio,
in order for these means to work.
Putting all this together, it seems likely that adopting the default rule
would simplify litigation and make judges’ gatekeeping job easier. It would
free them from the task of understanding and describing—or, in some
unfortunate cases, from misunderstanding and mischaracterizing—the

237
238
239

FED. R. EVID. 403.
Posner, supra note 8, at 1511.
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993).
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concept of statistical significance. For the same reasons, it would simplify the
job of attorneys in cases that involve experts.240
B. The Quantity of Litigation Activity Might or Might Not Increase with the
Fundamental Default Rule, but the Rule Likely Would Shift
Bargaining Power to Plaintiffs
What about the possibility that the fundamental default rule would spark
a dramatic increase in the volume of litigation? To ask whether one or another
rule would lead to “too much” litigation is to invite the question of what the
“right” amount of litigation is.
Writing in what functioned as dicta in a case involving due process and
state-law civil commitment proceedings, the Supreme Court long ago gave
one answer:
The standard [of proof] serves to allocate the risk of error between the
litigants and to indicate the relative importance attached to the ultimate
decision.
Generally speaking, the evolution of this area of the law has produced across
a continuum three standards or levels of proof for different types of cases. At
one end of the spectrum is the typical civil case involving a monetary dispute
between private parties. Since society has a minimal concern with the
outcome of such private suits, plaintiff ’s burden of proof is a mere
preponderance of the evidence. The litigants thus share the risk of error in roughly
equal fashion.241

How should one conceptualize the relationship between the “risk of error”
involved in litigation and the standard of proof? A common approach among
evidence law scholars is to use decision theory. This approach assigns a cost,
say, 𝐶𝐶S , to mistakenly finding against the defendant, and another cost, say, 𝐶𝐶l ,
to mistakenly finding against the plaintiff. In hypothesis testing terms,
mistaken determinations against the defendant entail rejecting the null

240 An additional question is how adopting the fundamental default rule would affect the set
of experts used in litigation. The current system presumably favors experts who can give simplesounding explanations of the complex concepts underlying conventional hypothesis testing. If courts
adopting the fundamental default rule required experts to explain Bayesian concepts, that would
additionally favor experts who can explain that approach; these might be different experts from the
first set, but the same type of skills would presumably be favored. Perhaps the biggest impact on the
set of experts would be that experts comfortable with the Bayesian approach but not with
conventional hypothesis testing would be ushered into court, and litigation more generally. That
kind of diversity of opinion would better reflect the world of practicing applied statisticians, which
could be a good thing.
241 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979) (emphasis added).
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hypothesis, so such mistakes are Type I errors (false positives). Mistaken
determinations in favor of the plaintiff entail Type II errors (false negatives).242
Decision theory seeks to find a decision rule that minimizes total expected
error costs. To do this, the following principles are helpful:
• The expected error cost associated with mistaken allowance of
estimation evidence is the product of cost 𝐶𝐶S and the probability of
a Type I error (again, a Type I error in this context means finding for
the plaintiff when the defendant’s position is the correct one).
• The expected error cost associated with mistaken rejection of
estimation evidence is the product of cost 𝐶𝐶l and the probability of
a Type II error (again, a Type II error in this context means finding
for the defendant when the plaintiff ’s position is the correct one).
The Supreme Court’s declaration that litigants should equally share the
risk of errors is often interpreted to mean that the two costs, 𝐶𝐶S and 𝐶𝐶l ,
should be treated as equal.243 It can be shown that if a decision rule minimizes
error costs, the ratio of cost 𝐶𝐶S to cost 𝐶𝐶l must equal the ratio of Type II
error probability to Type I error probability (i.e., the ratio of false
negatives to false positives).244 If the costs are equal, then the first ratio is
one, so the decision rule must cause the Type I and Type II error
probabilities to be equalized.
242 As Professor Frederick Schauer has pointed out to me in correspondence, “back in the old
days, Type I and Type II errors were not labeled according to false negatives and false positives, but
instead to ‘the error that we are most eager [or less eager] to avoid’.” Email from Frederick Schauer,
Professor of Law, Univ. of Va. Sch. of Law, to author (July 2, 2019, 10:23 EST) (on file with author)
(citing ERNEST KURNOW, GERALD J. GLASSER & FREDERICK R. OTTMAN, STATISTICS FOR
BUSINESS DECISIONS 235 (1959)).
243 For treatments of this point in the legal domain, see, e.g., Michelle M. Burtis, Jonah B.
Gelbach & Bruce H. Kobayashi, Error Costs, Legal Standards of Proof, and Statistical Significance, 25
SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 11 (2018) (discussing an error-cost minimization criterion for optimality,
showing that the preponderance standard meets it when the cost of Type I and Type II errors are
equal, and noting that the Supreme Court’s dicta in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) “suggests
such a weighting is appropriate in certain civil cases”); Cheng, supra note 50, at 1261 (stating that the
legal system does not demonstrate a preference between finding erroneously for the plaintiff or
defendant, with the implication that 𝐶𝐶( and 𝐶𝐶) should be equal); Michael S. Pardo, The Nature and
Purpose of Evidence Theory, 66 VAND. L. REV. 547, 561 (2013) (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361
(1970), for the proposition that error costs in civil cases should be treated as equal); Id. (citing
Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991), for the proposition that “the preponderance standard
‘results in a roughly equal allocation of the risk of error’”). A possible alternative interpretation is
that the two expected error costs are equal. On this understanding, “risk of error” means the cost of
error weighted by the probability it occurs. I am unaware of any authors who have adopted this
approach and shall not discuss it further.
244 See, e.g., Burtis, Gelbach & Kobayashi, supra note 243, at 11 (finding that the preponderance
standard and optimal standard mathematically derived coincide “when the cost of Type I and Type
II errors are equal”); Cheng & Pardo, supra note 51; Cheng, supra note 50, at 1260-61 (describing
how, when error costs between plaintiff and defendant are equal, the likelihood of a Type I or Type
II error are equal).
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The rest of the analysis is somewhat complicated because of the role that
prior beliefs play in determining the Type I and Type II error probabilities.
But if we view the evidence through the eyes of the plaintiff ’s most favorable
juror, then under some conditions it can be shown that following the
fundamental default rule leads to Type I and Type II error probabilities that
are both 50 percent.245 Thus, the fundamental default rule can be viewed as
the optimal decision rule given that error costs are treated as equal.246
All of that said, many observers would question Addington’s statement that
“society has a minimal concern with the outcome of . . . private suits.”247 A
lower standard of evidence will induce more lawsuits, or credible threats of
suit. That can be expected to induce changes in primary behavior.248 Whether
these changes in primary behavior are socially beneficial depends on context
and empirical facts outside the scope of any individual lawsuit.
This discussion of how the standard of evidence affects primary behavior
naturally raises the question of what such effects mean for the optimal
standard of evidence. There is a substantial theoretical law and economics
literature that attempts to answer this question, taking into account the fact
that the volume and quality of litigation is endogenous to the chosen
standard.249 This literature tends to abstract from important doctrinal and
institutional facts about litigation, most likely because these features
complicate economic modelling.250 Perhaps as a result, this literature has had
no apparent impact on procedural law (whether it has affected practice
untransparently is a different question).251 A serious engagement with this
These conditions require a quite technical explanation and so are omitted from this Article.
There are discussions in the literature of what should happen when costs vary across case
types. See, e.g., Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Econometrics in the Courtroom, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1048,
1062-63 (1985).
247 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979).
248 See works cited in Eric L. Talley, Law, Economics, and the Burden(s) of Proof, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF TORTS 325 (J. Arlen, ed. 2013) (stating that law and
economics “scholars have begun to deliver insights into how the equilibrium properties of litigation
are likely to have feedback effects on primary behavior of plaintiffs and defendants—the subject
matter that is most closely associated with substantive law (rather than procedural rules)”).
249 For examples of literature attempting to derive optimal standards of proof, see generally
Louis Kaplow, Likelihood Ratio Tests and Legal Decision Rules, 16 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1 (2014);
Louis Kaplow, Burden of Proof, 121 YALE L.J. 738 (2012); Louis Kaplow, On the Optimal Burden of
Proof, 119 J. POL ECON. 1104 (2011); Bruce L. Hay & Kathryn E. Spier, Burdens of Proof in Civil
Litigation: An Economic Perspective, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 413 (1997); Chris W. Sanchirico, The Burden
of Proof in Civil Litigation: A Simple Model of Mechanism Design, 17 INT’L. REV. L. & ECON. 431 (1997).
250 For example, Kaplow, Burden of Proof, supra note 249, ignores settlement and does not
discuss the role of doctrines such as viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
251 Kaplow acknowledges that “in order to undertake the important constructive task of making
sensible recommendations for system design, one would need context-specific empirical evidence
that is not readily available.” Kaplow, Burden of Proof, supra note 249, at 751-52. An approach that
requires unavailable data seems unlikely to have an impact on practice. A Westlaw search of sources
245
246

620

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 168: 549

literature is beyond the scope of the present Article. But it is possible to
imagine that a future engagement could yield useful heuristics for how the
standard of evidence should be adjusted when estimation evidence is involved.
Beyond that observation, I shall take it as given that some observers
oppose pretty much anything that increases litigation, while others take
roughly the opposite position. Under either view, the normatively interesting
question as to the volume of litigation is the simple positive one of whether
adopting the fundamental default rule would increase or decrease the amount
of litigation.
There are arguments to be made in each direction. Adopting the default
rule would liberalize evidentiary standards compared to what many judges
already do. That raises the expected value of potential plaintiffs’ claims in
those disputes in which the liberalization of evidentiary standards would
make a difference were the case litigated to judgment. Holding constant
primary behavior, an increase in the expected value of potential plaintiffs’
claims can be expected to yield more actual plaintiffs—or anyway, more
persons with a credible threat to litigate.
One possible result is that more lawsuits would be filed. Another is that
defendants would settle more cases before filing. Thus, it is possible that
adopting the default rule would reduce the amount of actual litigation, even
as it increased the amount of settlement activity even more. In that event, the
net result would be a bigger footprint for the civil justice system, broadly
considered, even as the actual burden on the courts fell due to a reduction in
the number of filed suits.252
Leaving aside the impact of adopting the fundamental default rule on the
number of filed suits, we might also ask how it would affect litigation in those
cases that would be filed regardless of the standard applied. Defendants could
expect to win less often on summary judgment, holding constant the set of
cases that have summary judgment motions. Some of these cases can be
expected to settle after the denial of summary judgment. Most likely, though,
there would be at least some additional post-summary judgment litigation
activity. But it is also possible that there would be a drop in the number of
Daubert and summary judgment motions courts must resolve, because the
default rule has brighter lines than current practice. And under the
fundamental default rule, at least some cases that would have Daubert and

citing Kaplow’s Article (conducted on October 22, 2019) yielded 68 secondary-source citations and
zero citations in case decisions or litigation materials.
252 A third possibility is that prospective defendants would adjust their primary behavior to
reduce the chances that they find themselves faced with credible threats to litigate. This is the
domain of the optimal-standard law and economics literature discussed just above.
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summary judgment motions under current practice would instead settle
before those motions are filed, reducing the burden on the courts.
Thus, adopting the default rule would have a complex set of effects on the
amount and nature of litigation activity, as could be expected from any change
in important procedural rules.253 What can be said for sure is that, holding
primary activity constant, adopting the default rule would shift bargaining
power toward those likely, under current practice, to have trouble getting
statistical evidence admitted and accepted as legally sufficient. As a result,
plaintiffs’ bargaining power would increase, and there would likely be a net
transfer of wealth to them from defendants.
For precisely this reason, potential defendants might be expected to
change their primary behavior. Employers would be likely to change HR
practices to reduce the circumstances under which statistical evidence would
point against them. Manufacturers, including drug and device makers, would
take greater precautions to reduce the chances that credible studies would
find their products are associated with injuries. And so on.
The prospect of the primary behavior effects just described will be
cheered by some and derided by others. Neither is in itself a reason to support
adopting the default rule. As discussed above, optimal evidentiary rules
involve the balancing of desirable deterrence and the unfortunate chilling of
desirable behavior.254
IV. FEDERAL COURTS COULD USE COMMON LAW POWERS TO
ADJUST THE EVIDENTIARY STANDARD IN
CASES BASED ON FEDERAL LAW
We have seen that gatekeeping with conventional hypothesis testing at
conventional significance levels erects a more demanding standard of proof
than that required by the Federal Rules, as understood through associated
case law. This implies that current gatekeeping practice generally is
inconsistent with the Rules to the extent that courts require evidence stronger
than whatever would support the plaintiff ’s case.255
But judicial practice is not necessarily unlawful merely because it is
without the Federal Rules. Here it is helpful to recall that law comes in
procedural and substantive flavors. The line between the two is famously

253 See Jonah B. Gelbach, Locking the Doors to Discovery? Assessing the Effects of Twombly and
Iqbal on Access to Discovery, 121 YALE L.J. 2270, 2320-21 (2012) (discussing predictable changes in
litigation behavior following the implementation of Twombly and Iqbal and providing empirical
evidence that at least some litigation behavior did change).
254 See supra note 249 and related citations.
255 Case-by-case review for reliability, under Rule 702, and to avoid jury confusion, under Rule
403, are still appropriate, as I discussed in Part VII.
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fuzzy; just as it’s tough to eat one flavor at a time in a cone of chocolate-andvanilla swirl, some legal propositions have one foot in procedure and the other
in substance. Care is needed to avoid too facile a set of conclusions about the
judicial development of evidentiary standards.
A first proposition is that the Federal Rules of Evidence were originally
enacted as a statute. Thus, the policies originally embodied in them are
backed with the full force of Congress’s constitutional power to legislate. A
second proposition is that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were
promulgated and have been amended pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act of
1934.256 The Enabling Act also gives the Supreme Court the power to amend
the Federal Rules of Evidence,257 which it has done from time to time. For
example, the original text of Rule 702 mentioned nothing about reliability;258
its starring role didn’t begin until the Supreme Court promulgated the 2000
Amendment through the Rules Enabling Act process.259 Thus, any form of
gatekeeping over and above the substantive content of the original Rule 702
is a child of either the Rules Enabling Act process or the common law powers
of federal judges (or both).260
The Enabling Act famously mandates that “[S]uch rules shall not abridge,
enlarge or modify any substantive right.”261 That might appear to mean that
neither the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure nor amendments to the Federal
Rules of Evidence may be understood to affect the strength-of-evidence
standard required for proof.262

256 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2018) (granting the Supreme Court “the power to prescribe general rules
of practice and procedure” for district and appellate courts).
257 Id. (granting the Supreme Court similar powers with respect to the rules of evidence).
258 The original text of Rule 702 was “If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in
the form of an opinion or otherwise.” Pub. L. No. 93–595, 88 Stat 1926, 1937 (1975).
259 See GEORGE FISHER, EVIDENCE 803 (2013) (explaining that subdivisions (c) and (d) of
Rule 702, which is where the word “reliable” appears, were added after Daubert as part of the 2000
amendment).
260 That is another basis for my claim that neither Daubert nor its subsequent textual
incorporation in Rule 702 lawfully can be the source of a transsubstantive standard of proof that
requires statistical significance at conventional significance levels. Either that requirement existed
previously in Rule 702—an unlikely proposition—or it is illegitimate.
261 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2018).
262 In Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 407, 411-14 (2010),
Justice Scalia read this part of the statute out of the U.S. Code, arguing that any Rule that “really
regulate[s] procedure” satisfies the Rules Enabling Act thanks to the application of statutory stare
decisis to an earlier discussion of § 2072(b). But Justice Scalia spoke for only four Justices in that part
of his opinion. A year later he found a use for § 2072(b) after all, writing for a unanimous court in
one part of his opinion in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 368 (2011) (see the discussion
and quotation surrounding note 291, infra). A six-Justice majority then validated § 2072(b) again in
2016 in Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1046-47 (2016).
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In assessing that understanding, it will help to distinguish two types of
litigation claims. The first type includes those claims for which the law
defining the claim engenders no special consideration of the standard of proof
that a plaintiff ’s evidence must meet. A garden variety contract claim would
fit in this group, as might a claim brought under, say, the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act.263 Federal courts adjudicating such claims apply the
preponderance standard thanks to the Supreme Court’s default rule.264 Of
course these courts must also apply the various sets of Federal Rules, but as I
have argued, those Rules do not alter the substantive standard of evidence.
Accordingly, lower federal courts have no warrant to hold statistical evidence
to more demanding proof requirements than the preponderance standard
where it applies. Requiring conventional hypothesis testing at conventional
significance levels in such cases is inconsistent with the law of evidence.
The second type of claims includes cases for which substantive law—
often, the law creating or otherwise shaping the claim—embodies a particular
set of evidentiary standards of proof. Consider again the Texas Supreme
Court’s Havner case. In that Bendectin-related tort case, the Court held that
tort plaintiffs seeking to use statistical evidence must present at least two
studies that support their contention.265 This is a statement about the
conditions under which the elements of a tort claim are proved. Erie R.R. Co.
v. Tompkins266 and related cases tell us that if the effect of the Texas Supreme
Court’s decision is to reject the preponderance standard, then it must be state
tort law, and not the Supreme Court’s common law policy in favor of the
preponderance standard, that governs. Another example, this time from a
claim rooted in federal law, is the clear and convincing evidence standard that
applies when a public figure brings a libel action.267 This elevated standard of
proof is an aspect of libel law, driven by First Amendment policy considerations.
To understand the appropriate role of federal common law powers in this
sphere, it is useful to separately consider claims that arise solely from state
law and those that arise from federal law. I treat these two types of claims in
the next two Sections.

263 Pub. L. No. 102-243, 105 Stat. 2395 (1991) (exemplifying a claim that does not include
special considerations of standard of proof).
264 See discussion in text at supra note 74 as well as cases cited in that note.
265 See Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 727 (Tex. 1997) (“[I]f scientific
methodology is followed, a single study would not be viewed as indicating that it is ‘more probable
than not’ that an association exists”).
266 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
267 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285-86 (1964) (invoking a standard of
“convincing clarity,” which has been treated subsequently as equivalent to the “clear and
convincing” standard).
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A. In Cases Based on State Law Claims, the State’s Law as to Statistical
Estimation Evidence Should Control in Federal Court
Federal courts have been bound since Erie to interpret the Rules of
Decision Act268 to respect the substance of state common law claims heard in
federal court, except when valid federal law preempts that substance.
Consider a case with all the basic facts of Havner, but assume it is heard
in federal rather than state court, after Havner; this essentially happened in
Cano v. Everest Minerals Corp, a case heard in the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas.269 Havner had announced a rule that
causation in a product liability suit cannot be proved with only a single study
providing statistical evidence.270 Subsequently, the Texas Supreme Court
described Havner as requiring that its “standards of reliability are met in at
least two properly designed studies.”271 These standards require that the
studies (1) report an estimated relative risk above 2.0 and (2) are able to reject
the null hypothesis of a true relative risk of 1.0 at the 95% confidence level.272
Accordingly, the federal courts must apply this rule unless valid federal law
preempts it.
And federal law does not preempt that rule. Texas law defines what
showing is needed to establish the fact at which the statistical evidence is
directed, namely injury causation. Havner’s required showing establishes a
greater-than-preponderance standard of proof under Texas law. If for some
reason the U.S. Constitution mandated the preponderance standard in
federal civil litigation, then by dint of the Supremacy Clause, federal courts
constitutionally would have to apply the preponderance standard to all Texas
tort claims. If instead a federal statute mandated that standard, then the
question would be whether Congress could lawfully enact such a pre-empting
statute.273 Of course, neither the Constitution nor the Statutes at Large (nor

28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2018).
362 F. Supp. 2d 814, 821 (W.D. Tex. 2005) (finding that because Havner dealt with the legal
sufficiency of evidence, it is a substantive law issue, and thus should be applied.).
270 Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 727.
271 Merck & Co., Inc., v. Garza, 347 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2011).
272 Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 718-19, 723-24. Relative risk is the ratio of the rate of occurrence of
an outcome in one group to another. For example, in the ASCOT-LLA study, the relative risk is
3.0% divided by 2.6%, or about 1.15. Sever, supra note 26, at 1153.
273 Under the most expansive reading of Erie, Congress lacks this power. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78
(“Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a State whether
they be local in their nature or ‘general,’ be they commercial law or a part of the law of torts.”). Of
course, if the statute were limited to tort suits involving interstate commerce, then subject to clear
statement rules and the like, it would be constitutional. (Query whether the duty of care owed a
trespasser along railroad tracks, at issue in Erie, doesn’t also implicate interstate commerce for at
least some track lines.)
268
269
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regulatory law) actually does such a thing. And certainly neither set of Federal
Rules at issue here purports to define a substantive standard of proof.
Thus, if Havner’s standard were to be preempted in federal court, it would
have to be because judge-made law requires federal courts to apply the
preponderance standard. But such a practice would spark forum shopping in
search of pro-plaintiff outcomes, implicating the core concern of Guaranty
Trust Co. v. York’s reworking of Erie.274 Accordingly, the general federal court
practice of applying the preponderance standard for determining legal
sufficiency must give way when a case within Havner’s domain is heard in
federal court.275
What if the Federal Rules did say the preponderance standard must
govern as to elements of substantive law? If such a provision had been
legislated by Congress, the only pertinent question would be the provision’s
constitutionality. Of course a constitutional statute would preempt thanks to
the Supremacy Clause.276 But no Federal Rule—not Rule 702 nor any other—
actually contains a standard of proof as to the elements of the substantive law
in a case.
So what should happen as to the admissibility of expert testimony in a
federal court case where legal sufficiency is controlled by Havner? The
District Court in Cano v. Everest Minerals Corp.277 got it exactly right:
whether expert testimony will assist the trier of fact is governed in part by
whether the testimony is relevant to the plaintiff’s burden of proof under the
274 Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 112 (1945) (holding that in diversity cases, the
outcome should be substantially the same in federal court as it would be in state court).
275 That is the position taken in Cano v. Everest Minerals Corp., 362 F. Supp. 2d 814, 821-22
(W.D. Tex. 2005) (concluding that because it was an issue under Texas substantive law, “that Havner
controls the issue of what evidence is required to establish causation in a toxic tort case”). Accord
Wells v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., No. A-06-CA-126-LY, 2009 WL 564303, at *8 (W.D. Tex. Feb.
18, 2009) (holding that “[t]his Court concludes that Havner establishes substantive Texas law on a
plaintiff ’s causation burden of proof.”). A three-judge panel of the Fifth Circuit addressed this issue,
but after assuming without deciding that Havner applied, it determined that the Havner standard
was met, and in any event its opinion was subsequently vacated. Bartley v. Euclid, Inc., 158 F.3d 261,
272-73 (5th Cir. 1998), vacated, 169 F.3d 215 (5th Cir. 1999).
276 The same would not be true if Daubert or an amendment to Rule 702 promulgated by the
Supreme Court through the REA process were the source of a conflict. In the case of Daubert, that
would amount to federal common law as to the area reserved to states by the Rules of Decision Act,
per Erie. Although Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965), gives the Supreme Court substantial
leeway through the REA process, it is clear there is a limit, including with respect to admissibility
of evidence. Tyson Foods v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1046 (2016) (“[W]here representative
evidence is relevant in proving a plaintiff ’s individual claim, that evidence cannot be deemed
improper merely because the claim is brought on behalf of a class. To so hold would ignore the Rules
Enabling Act’s pellucid instruction that use of the class device cannot ‘abridge . . . any substantive
right.’”). Increasing the standard of proof via an amendment to Rule 702 pursuant to the REA would
amount to an alteration of substantive rights, therefore contravening 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b).
277 362 F. Supp. 2d 814 (W.D. Tex. 2005).
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substantive law, and testimony that will not assist the trier of fact by
advancing an element of the plaintiff ’s case should be excluded.278

Consequently, the Cano court concluded, “Havner controls the issue of
what evidence is required to establish causation in a toxic tort case and
therefore what evidence is relevant.”279 Even though it holds that Havner
vitiates the preponderance standard as to statistical evidence, the Cano court
does not say Rule 702 fails to apply. Indeed, this court applied Rule 702(a)’s
helpfulness requirement and determined that evidence should be excluded
for failing to satisfy it.280 Thus, it is possible, and, I think, best, to read Cano
as accommodating both the substantive law set forth by the Texas Supreme
Court in Havner and binding federal evidence law set forth in the Rules.
Another way to put it is that the Federal Rules of Evidence do not exist
in a vacuum—they must be understood with reference to the governing
substantive law.281 Expert testimony based on studies that cannot meet
Havner’s requirements does not make it more probable that Havner’s
requirements are met. Consequently, such evidence cannot help the trier of
fact. In other words, Havner need not directly control the issue of
admissibility to affect what counts as helpful to the trier of fact.
My analysis of the Havner example shows that if state law imposes a
standard of proof requiring conventional hypothesis testing at conventional
significance levels, then federal courts hearing state claims are bound to
respect that standard in their own legal sufficiency determinations. Federal
courts must still follow the Federal Rules of Evidence for determining
admissibility. But that determination will be informed by what the
substantive law requires for a party to prevail on the merits. That is as it
should be in our small-“f ” federal system, in which states define important
areas of governing law, at least where that law has not been displaced via
constitutionally valid, and therefore supreme, federal law.282

278 Id. at 822 (citing Judge Kozinski’s opinion on remand in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 43
F.3d 1311, 1320 (9th Cir. 1995) (“In assessing whether the proffered expert testimony ‘will assist the
trier of fact’ in resolving this issue, we must look to the governing substantive standard . . . .”)).
279 Id.
280 Id. at 858.
281 For a qualitatively similar position about the connection between evidence law, substantive
law, and civil procedure in the context of class certification when statistical evidence is involved, see
Jonah B. Gelbach, The Triangle of Law and the Role of Evidence in Class Action Litigation, 165 U. PA.
L. REV. 1807 (2017).
282 U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (“[T]he laws of the United States which shall be made in
pursuance [of the Constitution] . . . shall be the supreme law of the land”).

2020]

Estimation Evidence

627

B. The Supreme Court Has Common Law Powers to Alter the Standard of
Evidence for Federal Law Claims, but It Should Use Them
Transparently Rather Than Characterizing These Powers
in Terms of the Federal Rules of Evidence
Civil claims under federal law are generally governed by the standard
Congress sets, if it has set one.283 Congress has done so in many areas,284 but
it has also left the standard of proof unstated in many statutes. When a claim
arises from a federal statute that specifies no standard of proof, courts must
step in. As discussed above, the Supreme Court’s default rule has been the
preponderance standard.285 The Court has explained that “[a]ny other
standard expresses a preference for one side’s interests.”286 Accordingly, it has
self-consciously embraced elevated standards of proof only when “particularly
important individual interests or rights are at stake.”287 Most such examples
involve Fourteenth Amendment Due Process as applied to state law actions.288
The practice of raising the standard of proof when statistical evidence is
involved does not fit this pattern. Liability related to statistical evidence may
generate real public policy concerns, but it does not generally create a
situation in which “particularly important individual interests or rights
are at stake.”289
Justice Scalia’s opinion in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes290 might be
misread to the contrary. In a part of his opinion in which he spoke for a
unanimous court, he emphasized that a defendant has a right to mount any
283 See Microsoft Corp. v. I4I Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 91 (2011) (“Where Congress has
prescribed the governing standard of proof, its choice generally controls.”).
284 See Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 288 (1991) (collecting examples from the federal
statutes in which Congress announced the preponderance standard for various forms of fraud,
including, inter alia, those brought under the False Claims Act and those involving Medicare and
Medicaid fraud).
285 See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 421-23 (1979).
286 Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 390 (1983).
287 Grogan, 498 U.S. at 286 (quoting Herman & MacLean, 459 U.S. at 389-390).
288 E.g., Herman & MacLean, 459 U.S. at 389 (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982),
and noting that Santosky proceeded to terminate parental rights); Addington, 421 U.S. at 425-27
(involuntary commitment proceeding); Woodby v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 385 U.S.
276, 285-86 (1966) (deportation). There are exceptions. One is patent validity. See Radio Corp. of
Am. v. Radio Eng’g Labs., 293 U.S. 1, 8 (1934) (subsequently held by the Supreme Court to be
codified by 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2018)) (noting that there is a presumption of validity of patents, and
“one otherwise an infringer who assails the validity of a patent fair upon its face bears a heavy burden
of persuasion, and fails unless his evidence has more than a dubious preponderance.”); Microsoft
Corp., 564 U.S. at 104-05 (noting the same presumption of validity). Another, somewhat obscure,
example is union bargaining with multiple employers. See United Mine Workers of Am. v.
Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 665 (1965) (holding that a union’s normal antitrust exemption is vitiated
when it is “clearly shown that [the union] has agreed with one set of employers to impose a certain
wage scale on other bargaining units”).
289 Herman & MacLean, 459 U.S. at 389.
290 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011).
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defense it has to a claim. He then described the district court’s trial plan as
“Trial by Formula,” in which
A sample set of the class members would be selected, as to whom liability for
sex discrimination and the backpay owing as a result would be determined in
depositions supervised by a master. The percentage of claims determined to
be valid would then be applied to the entire remaining class, and the number
of (presumptively) valid claims thus derived would be multiplied by the
average backpay award in the sample set to arrive at the entire class
recovery—without further individualized proceedings. We disapprove that
novel project. Because the Rules Enabling Act forbids interpreting Rule 23 to
“abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right,” a class cannot be certified
on the premise that Wal–Mart will not be entitled to litigate its statutory
defenses to individual claims.291

Two things are clear from this passage. First, what was at issue was not
estimation evidence as it is usually understood. The statistical information
here would have involved applying information about the judgments in a
small set of cases to the adjudication of claims of other class members. But
leaving aside traditional issue preclusion, it is difficult to see how the master’s
determinations would even satisfy Rule 401’s relevance definition with respect
to the non-sampled cases. Second, the modification of the substantive right
at issue has nothing to do with the standard of proof. So Dukes cannot possibly
stand for any principle about especially important individual rights affected
by ordinary estimation evidence.
A third important fact about Dukes is that the majority’s disposition of the
case was in important ways a holding about substantive Title VII law as such.
In the part of Dukes that garnered only a bare majority’s support, the Court
forbade class litigation to attack Wal-Mart’s corporate policy of allowing
store-level managers the discretion to make various employment decisions.292
In so doing, the Court overtly relied on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23(a)(2)’s commonality requirement, declaring that store-level discretion “is
just the opposite of a uniform employment practice that would provide the
commonality needed for a class action.”293 But as Professor Tobias Barrington
Wolff has explained, this holding says much more about substantive Title VII
law than it does about what’s needed for commonality under Rule 23(a)(2).294
Id. at 367 (citations omitted).
Id. at 355-60.
Id. at 355.
This is laid bare by imagining that “the Court had found that a company-wide policy of
reposing discretion in store-level managers could support a Title VII injunction because of its
capacity to impose a disparate impact upon women, regardless of how that policy plays out in
particular stores.” Tobias Barrington Wolff, Managerial Judging and Substantive Law, 90 WASH. U.
291
292
293
294
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Thus Dukes is a useful prism for present purposes because it reflects how
substantive law can get made in what looks like a procedural case. When
federal courts impose an elevated standard of proof as to statistical evidence,
they are doing what the Dukes Court did—making substantive law. That is so
even if they say they are merely following federal evidence law.
Now, as I noted above, jacking up the standard of proof is something
federal courts traditionally have done only when especially important
individual interests ride on the outcome. Critics of the fundamental default
rule will predictably challenge it on the ground that adopting it would bring
substantial economic costs. And they may be right. But if the Supreme Court
is worried about such baleful effects, then rule-of-law values counsel that it
should not hide behind evidence law. Instead, the Court should be transparent
that it is using its common law powers—where they exist—to make new law.
Does the Supreme Court have such common law powers in important
litigation areas? It acts as if it does. We have already seen that Dukes is in part
a determination about the substantive law of Title VII, and it certainly reads
like common law. As Professor Wolff explains, in Dukes (and other Title VII
cases),
the Court has taken portions of a regulatory statute that do not specify the
methods of evaluating proof or administering remedies and set forth a body
of judge-made law designed to carry into effect the express provisions of the
statute and the policies underlying them. . . . [T]he rulings. . . also constitute
affirmative statements of policy by the federal courts, making substantive
decisions within the framework Congress set forth about the balance between
reasonable opportunities for plaintiff recovery, on the one hand, and
protection of defendants from unwarranted liability or settlement pressure,
on the other.295

If the Supreme Court can do all that, why can’t it determine the
appropriate balance between “opportunities for plaintiff recovery. . . and
protection of defendants” when the issue is what standard of proof to apply
for statistical evidence? I think it can. In fact, it already has, in the line of
cases, discussed above, that set up the preponderance standard as a default
rule in the first place.
If the Court is to modify the default rule of preponderance, or make
exceptions in specific substantive areas, it should state clearly and forthrightly
the policy concerns that motivate it. That would improve democratic
accountability by allowing the public and Congress a basis to evaluate the
L. REV. 1027, 1038 (2013). Such a holding could not be merely procedural, limited to remedies in the
abstract, because it necessarily would have delineated the rights and obligations created by Title VII.
295 Id. at 1044.
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desirability of whatever rule the Court announces, facilitating legislative
action if Congress or the public think the Court has gotten it wrong. In
addition, explaining the substantive basis for policies raising the standard of
proof for statistical evidence would promote rule-of-law values such as
predictability and clarity—something that is in short supply in the federal
courts when statistical estimation evidence is at issue.
CONCLUSION
In this Article I construct a theory of how federal courts should treat
statistical estimation evidence at key pre-trial moments in civil litigation.
Using black-letter law and the theory of statistical estimation together, I show
that the Federal Rules require much more liberal treatment of plaintiffs’
statistical evidence than much current practice reflects. When statistical
evidence fits well with the litigation question at which it is directed, the
fundamental default rule of statistical estimation evidence holds that such
evidence generally is admissible and legally sufficient for the proposition to
which it speaks whenever it points in the direction of the party offering it.
Using the fundamental default rule will also be much easier to administer
than the status quo, alleviating a substantial amount of confusing and
confused writing about probability theory by judges and attorneys who lack
the expertise to do it well.
Despite my conclusion that present applications of Rule 702 are too stingy
with respect to statistical evidence, the Supreme Court can use federal
common law policy making powers—where it has them—to impose elevated
standards of proof in cases where they are warranted. When it deploys these
powers, the Supreme Court should do so overtly in order to facilitate
legislative responses and transparency. And of course, Congress and state
bodies with legislative powers are available, too.
APPENDIX: MULTIPLE STUDIES
There is a simple way to handle multiple studies. Let 𝜃𝜃 be the true effect
size whose value is the object of statistical estimation. Suppose we have data
from 𝑆𝑆 studies that are thought to be reliable. Let 𝜃𝜃Un be the estimator of effect
size from study 𝑂𝑂. Assume that each estimator is consistent and
asymptotically normal. Different studies’ estimates will have different
estimated standard errors due to differences in sample sizes and possibly
other conditions such as the set of covariates available for use. So we must
find a way to account for variation in 𝜎𝜎n , the standard error for study 𝑂𝑂.
When the various studies’ estimators are all statistically independent of
each other, it can be shown that the weighted average of them that has
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minimum asymptotic variance is 𝜃𝜃p̅ ≡ ∑pnu$ 𝑤𝑤
tn 𝜃𝜃Un , where the weight 𝑤𝑤
tn ≡
twxy
v
z
∑w{$ v
twxy

. In words, the denominator of the weight is the sum of the inverses

of the estimated variances of the 𝑆𝑆 available estimators. The numerator of the
weight is the inverse estimated variance of estimator 𝑂𝑂. Assuming each
estimator 𝜃𝜃Un is consistent, each has probability limit equal to the true value
𝜃𝜃. This means the probability limit of 𝜃𝜃p̅ is a weighted average of the constant
𝜃𝜃, so 𝜃𝜃p̅ also has probability limit equal to 𝜃𝜃.
Because each 𝜃𝜃Un is asymptotically normal, a weighted average of them is
asymptotically normal as well. The variance of a weighted sum of
independent estimators is the same weighted sum of the individual variances,
so it is approximately true that 𝑉𝑉(𝜃𝜃p̅ ) = ∑pnu$(𝑒𝑒𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝 𝑤𝑤
tn )y 𝜎𝜎ny =
(∑pnu$ 𝜎𝜎n}y )}$ , because the probability limit of the estimated variance 𝜎𝜎"n y is
𝜎𝜎ny and the probability limit of 𝑤𝑤
tn is ∑z
Now let 𝑇𝑇Up =

w
~

vwxy
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\∑z
twxy ] y
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.

. This is the ratio of an asymptotically normal

statistic to a consistent estimator of the square-root of its variance, so its
limiting distribution is standard normal. Accordingly, we may treat the
statistic 𝑇𝑇Up just as we treated the t-statistic from a single study. In effect, it is
as if there is a single meta-study of studies, whose evidence may be combined
in the best (i.e., minimum variance) way and then used as if it were the
evidence provided by a single study.
Repeating the analysis from the main text would show that the
fundamental default rule continues to hold, as applied to the statistic 𝑇𝑇Up
rather than any one study’s t-statistic.296

296 Because of the variance reduction entailed by averaging the t-statistics, though, using
conventional critical values for the average t-statistic would turn out to be more demanding than in
the one-study case.
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